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The current study seeks to synthesize concepts from organizational behavior management and 
behavioral economics through an exploratory, translational paradigm.  The degree to which 
workplace contingencies are subject to variables common to the behavioral economic literature 
was assessed in three experiments.  The first experiment was a hypothetical discounting task that 
extended the cross-commodity discounting literature by comparing monetary outcomes with 
access to mobile devices, a potential competing reward in organizational settings.  The second 
experiment was a systematic replication of Experiment 1 in the context of the workplace. The 
third experiment examined the effects of probability on the efficacy of an incentive system in an 
analogue work environment.  The applicability of behavioral economics, specifically 
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Effects of Probabilistic Arrangements of Incentives and Disincentives on Work Task 
Performance in an Analogue Setting 
Since the early 1900s, psychologists have studied the workplace in an effort to provide 
assessment, improve employee performance, and revise personnel selection procedures.  The 
field of Industrial and Organizational Psychology (IOP) has been a staple of workplaces ever 
since.  Organizations have turned to psychology to understand why some employees perform 
better than others.  Some employees will go above and beyond the call of duty, expend more 
effort, complain less, take initiative, and become champions for organizational improvement 
while others expend only enough effort to avoid being fired or disciplined.  Myriad management 
fads have emerged over the course of time, each promising to resolve organizational problems 
and convert problem employees into model employees.  Fads are rarely based on evidence and 
even the mainstay organizational practices typical of modern workplaces remain problematic 
(Daniels, 1994).  For example, traditional wage-pay systems fail to produce desired workplace 
behaviors and characterize what Abernathy (2011) describes as “sins.”  Pay for time will yield 
employees who are consistently present, but not motivated employees.  Another “sin” involves 
manager reliance on punishment for discretions and adoption of the credo “no news is good 
news” resulting in ignoring employees performing adequately.  Managers often adopt a style 
they feel suits them and fail to base their methods on a precise science of human behavior, which 
Daniels (1994) suggests is akin to a surgeon ignoring medical science and established procedures 
by adopting a personal style. 
Through this lens, the necessity of psychology in the workplace is clear.  Many issues 
have plagued supervisors and employees and historically, the traditional methods of management 




workplaces often fail to yield the results organizations are seeking, prompting managers to ask 
how to best motivate their employees.  Daniels (2011) suggests managers should not ask why 
some employees are more motivated than others, but why the workplace is less motivating than 
non-work contexts.  He points out that many people will expend a great deal of effort and 
personal resources without complaint in pursuit of their hobbies, in effect behaving like perfect 
employees.  The reasons for differences in motivation are rooted in the science of behavior. 
Behavior Analysis in the Workplace 
 The application of psychological principles to the workplace is within the purview of two 
disciplines: IOP and Organizational Behavior Management (OBM).  While the purpose of both 
disciplines is similar, some substantial differences exist.   IOP has made several contributions to 
understanding organizational issues such as personnel selection, performance appraisal (Bucklin, 
Alvero, Dickinson, Austin, & Jackson, 2000), and job “fit” and satisfaction (Mawhinney, 2011). 
However, IOP lacks a cohesive theoretical base leading to the absence of conceptually 
systematic applications. The data-driven focus on the prediction and control of well-defined 
measures of individual performance and organization-level outcomes characteristic of OBM 
approaches are arguably better suited to address a variety of relevant subjects.  OBM is a sub-
discipline of applied behavior analysis, which is its unifying conceptual foundation.  OBM is the 
application of the principles of behavior discovered and developed by E. L. Thorndike, J. B. 
Watson, and B. F. Skinner (Wilder, Austin, & Casella, 2009).  OBM has three sub-disciplines: 
behavioral systems analysis, behavior-based safety, and performance management. 
Behavioral systems analysis (BSA) is the integration of behavior analysis and systems 
theory and provides a method for identifying areas for improvement and maintaining high 




Diener, McGee, & Miguel, 2009).  BSA focuses on the practices of groups of individuals (e.g., 
within organizations) that are either maintained or fail to be maintained as a function of the 
collective contingencies experienced by its members (e.g., Glenn, 1988).  Several models for 
evaluating and changing organizationally relevant behaviors of employees have been described 
including the Total Performance System (Brethower, 1982) and the adaptive systems model 
(Rummler & Brache, 1995).  The goals of systems analyses include improving organizational 
outcomes through four steps including identification of outcomes, organizational practices, the 
contingencies between practices and outcomes, and factors that immediately affect practices 
(Redmon & Mason, 2001). 
 The prevalence of workplace injuries in industry and the newly emerging health risks of 
repetitive, sedentary lifestyles typical of modern business have created the necessity for 
behavior-based safety (BBS).  BBS is a sub-discipline focused on changing work environments 
to reduce and prevent injury.  Unlike other approaches to reducing injury that focus on industrial 
design and mechanical safety devices, BBS targets the human behavior related to workplace 
safety (Wilder et al., 2009).  Safety interventions in OBM have been implemented in a variety of 
settings including construction, manufacturing, transportation, mining, and several other 
industries (Sulzer-Azaroff & Austin, 2000).  BBS interventions may also target cultural variables 
within an organization to promote safety using principles from humanistic psychology, referred 
to as person-based safety or a Total Safety Culture (e.g., Geller, 2001).  BBS interventions 
promote the use of employees as change agents where peers conduct safety observations and 
provide feedback when they observe risky situations or behaviors. 
Performance management refers to the application of behavioral principles to employee 




2009).  As a sort of umbrella term, performance management encompasses a variety of 
procedures and methods.  Similarly to practices with children and individuals with disabilities, 
performance management practitioners may conduct assessments of performance issues to 
determine the cause of the problem (e.g., Austin, 2000).  An intervention that addresses 
performance problems due to a lack of skills is behavioral skills training (Sarokoff & Sturmey, 
2004), which is a multicomponent training package typically consisting of instructions, 
modeling, rehearsal, and feedback.  For issues resulting from motivational or effort deficits—
employees are adequately trained but fail to perform as desired—other interventions may be 
employed.  Such interventions include feedback (e.g., Prue & Fairbank, 1981), goal setting (e.g., 
Fellner & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1984), self-monitoring (e.g., Olson & Winchester, 2008), and 
incentive systems (e.g., Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001) 
Within performance management, several research themes have emerged, including rule-
governance, feedback, analogues to reinforcement, and the economics of reinforcement in the 
workplace via behavioral economics (Johnson, Mawhinney, & Redmon, 2001).  The emphasis of 
the following sections will be on workplace reinforcement and economics. 
Skinner (1987) outlines the three determinant of human behavior: natural selection, 
ontogenic selection by consequences, and socially mediated cultural contingencies.  As 
phylogeny refers to the selection of variants at the level of species, so ontogeny refers to the 
selection of variants in behavior within the lifetime of an organism.  Behaviors that are 
reinforced are maintained while others are extinguished or suppressed through punishment.  
Within cultures, behaviors and practices are selectively passed on to new generations, 
comprising the third mode of selection.  These hold true for employee behavior as well.  That is, 




that establish and maintain the relevant behaviors.  Work behaviors are selected because 
employees contact success, either automatically through completing a task, or through 
commendation or praise from others.  Perhaps one of the most salient contingencies in the 
workplace is the contingency between work behaviors and pay.  Unfortunately, a lack of a tight 
contingency between work and pay exists in traditional organizational systems (Abernathy, 
2011).  Employees typically receive pay on the basis of time spent in the work setting.  Pay 
arrangements that directly tie pay to employee output are called pay-for-performance or 
performance pay in the literature.  Making payment contingent on observable and clearly defined 
performance is effective in improving employee behavior across a variety of arrangements 
(Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001).   
Several methods exist for making pay at least partially contingent on performance (e.g., 
Dixon, Hayes, & Stack, 2003).  Profit sharing is the practice of linking employee bonuses to 
organizational profit.  When the organization does well, the employees receive a share of 
increased profits as a bonus.  Gainsharing is a similar practice, but employee bonuses are 
determined through cost-savings in organizational processes.  When employees make 
improvement in organizational processes that reduce the operating costs of the organization, the 
savings are placed into an incentive pool and employees receive a share.  Both of these practices 
align employee goals with organizational goals—increased profits and reduced costs—but the 
contingency between performance and pay is still indirect.  Presumably the employee behaviors 
that led to improvements in outcomes would be maintained, but there is a delay between 
behavior and reward up to a year in annual bonus arrangements.  Finally, employees may receive 
incentive pay directly linked to individual performance.  Organizations may deliver incentive 




work units completed.  Other methods for linking empirical measures of performance to pay are 
available for employees whose work outcomes are not discrete and countable (e.g., profit-
indexed performance pay; Abernathy, 2011). 
 Currently, the literature has provided several considerations for designing an effective 
incentive system.  The subject of individual incentives is one of few in the literature that has 
received attention across the full spectrum of basic-to-applied research.  Bucklin and Dickinson 
(2001) identified three themes in the individual incentive literature in their extensive review, 
including (a) the proportion of an employee’s pay available through incentives compared to base 
pay; (b) the schedule of incentive delivery; and (c) arrangements of incentive amount as a 
function of performance level (e.g., accelerating, decelerating, or linear piece-rates).  First, a line 
a research arose from a case study in incentives systems at a bank (Dierks & McNally, 1987).  
The bank case study led to research questions regarding what proportion of employee pay made 
available as incentives would promote the highest performance.  This proportion can range from 
100%—where employees earn pay as piece rate—to lower proportions in which incentives are 
available above some amount of base-pay (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001).  Abernathy (2001) 
analyzed data from several companies, concluding incentive systems offering bonuses 
amounting to less than 20% of base pay were less effective.  However, other applied studies and 
reviews in incentive systems suggested smaller incentives were still effective (e.g., Komaki, 
Coombs, Redding, & Schepman, 2000).  Laboratory and translational studies of incentive 
proportions also suggested performance was higher when participants were able to earn 
incentives compared to receiving a base or hourly payment (e.g., Frisch & Dickinson, 1990). 
 Ambiguous results were also produced when fixed versus variable schedules of incentive 




continuous schedules of reinforcement to fixed or variable ratio schedules (e.g., Pritchard, 
Hollenback, & DeLeo, 1980; Latham & Dossett, 1978).  Dickinson and Poling (1996) concluded 
in their review of this literature that incentive pay again produced better performance than hourly 
pay alone.  In addition, they did not obtain systematic differences in performance across studies 
with respect to fixed versus variable schedules of reinforcement. 
 Finally, researchers have evaluated the effects of varying the amount of the incentive 
depending on the number of work units produced.  Oah and Dickinson (1991) compared a linear 
piece rate (in which the incentive amount was the same for each unit completed) to an 
accelerating piece rate (in which the incentive amount was increased for each unit completed).  
Their rationale for the accelerating piece rate is that as more units are completed, it becomes 
qualitatively more difficult to produce further gains in rate (i.e., as performance approaches the 
ceiling of what can be done in some amount of time).  However, their results showed comparable 
levels of performance for both incentive schemes.  Smoot and Duncan (1997) evaluated linear, 
accelerating and decelerating piece rates.  In one experiment, participants performed the best 
under a linear piece rate while a second experiment showed better performance under the 
accelerating piece rate.  Given the varied and inconsistent results across studies in these three 
thematic lines of research, Bucklin and Dickinson (2001) concluded the ratio contingency 
between performance and pay appears to be the most consistently effective variable in increasing 
work performance. 
In practice, incentives are often arranged for instances of employee behavior other than as 
a direct exchange between work units and reward.  Managers might want to reward employees in 
the moment just for being on-task or for performing particularly well in a given instance.  This is 




could not be located that describes the use of monetary reinforcement in this way, the literature 
provides examples of the use of social reinforcement   For example, Eikenhout and Austin 
(2004) reported an intervention in a department store with the goal to improve customer service 
behaviors among employees.  The intervention consisted of a package of goal-setting, graphic 
feedback, and reinforcement.  Reinforcement was delivered both weekly and immediately with 
the immediate feedback being delivered by supervisors contingent upon being “caught in the act” 
of delivering good customer service.  Supervisors were trained to deliver feedback and were 
encouraged to spend time on the sales floor at least three times daily to observe for instances of 
good customer service to reinforce.  The package intervention was very effective, with effect 
sizes of 1.68 or higher for all targeted behaviors (Cohen’s d).  The effects of the immediate 
reinforcement alone cannot be determined from the results because a component analysis was 
not completed. 
Effective managers immediately deliver reinforcers contingent upon a desired behavior, 
which means they spend time among employees so they can directly observe behavior (Daniels, 
1994).  The problem is that although managers and supervisors are responsible for checking in 
on employees, they also spend a great deal of time in their own offices during which time they 
are not directly monitoring staff (Roberts & Geller, 1995).  In scenarios such as this, employees 
are under a variable or random schedule of reinforcement, or an approximation to these 
schedules.  Hantula (2001) describes the importance of looking to the literature on schedules of 
reinforcement in designing incentive systems claiming, “[t]he question to be addressed is not 
whether schedules are operating in a given context, but which schedules are operating” (p.160, 
emphasis in original).  The relevance of this perspective to organizations is that whether 




delivered without regard to a pre-planned schedule, a schedule is in effect and can be quantified.  
Ferster and Skinner (1957) and Herrnstein (1970) describe the profound impact varying 
schedules of reinforcement can have on behavior.  Understanding how schedules affect 
employee behavior allows organizations to leverage these effects rather than simply hope 
whatever schedule happens to be in effect is maintaining optimum levels of performance. 
The study of the effects of schedules of reinforcement on organizational performance 
provides a connection to economic principles (Hantula, 2001).  Behavioral interventions 
essentially constitute an economic system and the characteristics of that system will influence the 
effectiveness of the intervention (Hursh, 1980). Findings from the field of microeconomics can 
complement decades of behavior analytic research about the links between schedules, response 
rates, and choice.  A synthesis of microeconomics and behavior analysis could help to provide a 
more complete account of behavior.  The following section will provide an overview of two 
alternative views of economics (i.e., normative economic theory and behavioral economics), and 
highlight areas of behavioral economics relevant to the design of incentive systems in 
organizational settings including choice architecture and environmental arrangements that affect 
consumer behavior, concepts related to consumer demand for commodities, and factors that 
affect the valuation of consequences (i.e., discounting). 
Behavioral Economics 
 Among its several definitions, economics is a field studying the financial considerations 
regarding an activity or commodity (Oxford English Dictionary).  Economists have studied how 
humans behave and make choices under various conditions, including how people value 
commodities.  Camerer and Loewenstein (2004) posit that economics is implicitly a science of 




consumer behavior and the ability to predict such behavior. Economic models of human decision 
making tend to be normative (i.e., what rational consumers should do) as opposed to being 
descriptive of what consumers actually do, leading to failures in predicting real economic 
behavior (Thaler, 1980).  Thaler and Sunstein (2008) suggest standard economic theory assumes 
humans have a high degree of rationality, self-control, and the absence of biases that leads to 
behaving in ways that achieve outcomes that are objectively best.  Ariely (2008) suggests 
humans consistently make errors in decision making—behaving predictably irrationally.  For 
example, the difference between one apple today or two tomorrow, and one apple in a year or 
two apples in a year plus one day are the same. Empirical research in choice and decision making 
reveals that perception of those options differs.  When both outcomes are delayed, people tend to 
show more self-control and choose the larger of the two outcomes.  As time passes and the 
options become more proximal as in the former pair, more people tend to choose the less delayed 
option (Thaler, 1981).  The changing of preference between these two pairs represents a violation 
of the principle of invariance, which states that when two outcomes differ in utility, the 
preference order between them should not vary depending on how they are presented (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1984).  To better explain patterns of human choice and decision making, behavioral 
economics has emerged as the empirical examination of realistic economic behavior that focuses 
on testable and generalizable theories and predictions (Camerer & Loewenstein, 2004). 
Having the means to more completely understand human choice and decision behavior is 
likely to directly benefit the analysis of behavior in several contexts including organizations.  
Employee behavior occurs in a complex context in which several concurrent contingencies may 
be in place, and employees engage in choice behavior insofar as they allocate their behavior one 




organization’s ability to shift said allocation from unproductive to productive, risky to safe, or 
inefficient to efficient.  Some relevant findings from the behavioral economics literature are 
described below. 
 Formulation effects and choice architecture.  Framing, priming, and anchoring are 
phenomena by which the formulation of options affects choice.  Framing refers to the 
phenomenon in which the description of a scenario influences the perception of outcomes 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  For example, gains are treated differently than losses, items an 
individual owns are more valuable than the same item before it is owned (the endowment effect), 
and pure losses are treated differently than costs—in which some loss is accompanied by the 
receipt of some benefit—despite objectively equivalent values.  Priming refers to a phenomenon 
in which the information provided before a choice scenario influences preference.  Lee, 
Frederick, and Ariely (2006) asked participants to choose between two beers, a commercial beer 
and the same beer with vinegar added.  Without the information about the added ingredient, 
more participants preferred the doctored beer.  When the experimenter told participants the 
difference between the two beers was the addition of vinegar, more participants preferred the 
regular beer.  Bertini, Ofek, and Ariely (2009) obtained a similar effect with coffee.  When the 
experimenter presented coffee in an analogue scenario along with condiments in attractive 
commercial containers, participants rated the coffee as more desirable and agreed to pay more 
than when the experimenter presented the same coffee alongside the same condiments in foam 
cups. 
In another study, Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003) describe how prior exposure to 
arbitrary numbers based on survey respondents’ social security numbers influenced their answers 




prior to evaluating the items gave higher values than respondents who received a lower number, 
an example of the anchoring phenomenon.  In addition, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) describe a 
range of other environmental manipulations that alter choice behaviors, referred to as choice 
architecture.  Briefly, choice architecture is the arrangement of the choice environment that 
increases the likelihood that an individual will choose one option over another.  For example, 
such arrangements might include changing the default option, making the desired option less 
effortful, or structuring complex choices with which people have less experience. 
 Demand.  In addition to the aforementioned phenomena in choice arrangements, Hursh 
(1980) argues scientists can obtain a more complete account of behavior by borrowing from 
economics.  If an organization arranges consequences to change behavior, it is necessary to 
understand how valuable such a consequence is to employees, realistically.  That is, managers 
need to understand the relation between effort and consumption of the arranged consequence.  
Behavioral economic research has facilitated this understanding by observing the consumption of 
varying reinforcers in closed economic systems and allocation of behavior between competing 
contingencies, or choice behavior (Hursh, Madden, Spiga, DeLeon, & Francisco, 2013).  
Analysis of consumption parallels the economic concept of demand in which price is determined 
by a schedule of reinforcement and consumption refers to the quantity of the reinforcer obtained 
by the organism.  The law of demand states that as the price of a commodity increases, 
consumption will decrease (Hursh et al., 2013).  By providing access to a given contingency for 
an extended period of time, experimenters can determine the amount of the reinforcer that 
participants will consume at that price.  Studies that have evaluated consumption over a wide 
range of prices have demonstrated a curvilinear relation between price and consumption.  The 




varying conditions and a means for empirically comparing relative value across commodities.  
For example, as price increases, organisms will work harder to defend rates of consumption for 
some commodities over others.  That is, demand is more inelastic for some commodities than 
others.  Commodities for which an organism will work harder to defend baseline levels of 
consumption have a higher essential value (Hursh et al., 2013). 
 Other variables influence the value of commodities.  When the commodity is available 
outside of the experimental context—as it is in some operant arrangements where the organism 
receives a free maintenance ration following the experimental session to maintain a constant 
level of deprivation—the organism is in an open economy.  Hursh (1980) showed that in an open 
economy, response rates decreased as a function of price whereas in a closed economic system—
one in which the organism earns its entire daily ration in the experimental context—response 
rates increased with price.  The availability of other commodities that are fully or partially 
substitutable for the commodity under study can also influence demand.  The effect of the 
availability of a commodity on demand for another commodity is used to classify the commodity 
as a substitute, complement, or independent.  Demand for a commodity increases with 
consumption of a complementary commodity, decreases with consumption of substitutes, and 
does not change with consumption of independent commodities (Hursh et al., 2013). 
 The selection of effective reinforcers is a topic where demand is particularly relevant for 
organizations.  Wilder, Rost, and McMahon (2007) showed that managers are not particularly 
proficient at predicting employee preference for reinforcers.  Managers may turn to reinforcer 
surveys or formal preference assessments to identify reinforcers (e.g., Waldvogel & Dixon, 
2008).  The issue of realistic value still remains once preferred stimuli have been identified.  That 




relatively low.  As price increases, however, individuals may be less willing to work for the 
reward (e.g., Reed, Niileksela, & Kaplan, 2013).  A demand-based analysis of the relation 
between price and consumption is uniquely suited to facilitating the identification of effective 
and resource-efficient reinforcers. 
Discounting.  Beyond demand, other features of consequence delivery impact the value 
and effectiveness of commodities and outcomes as either reinforcers or punishers.  Collectively, 
these factors are evaluated under a framework referred to as discounting.  The systematic 
reduction in the subjective value of a delayed outcome is referred to as temporal discounting, 
which has been suggested as a mechanism for impulsivity as discounting describes the 
undervaluing of delayed consequences and overvaluing of immediate consequences (e.g., 
Ainslie, 1975).  In addition, an expanding literature base has proposed temporal discounting 
plays a role in a variety of clinical disorders including drug addiction, pathological gambling, 
obesity, and other health problems (e.g., Bickel, Jarmolowicz, Mueller, Koffarnus, & Gatchalian, 
2012; Bickel, Miller, Yi, Kowal, Lindquist, & Pitcock, 2007). 
Binary choice procedures are often used in the assessment of discounting.  In the case of 
temporal discounting, the choices presented are an immediate outcome and a delayed one.  The 
goal is to determine a measure of indifference between the two options.  This indifference point, 
then, provides a measure of the value or effectiveness of a delayed outcome compared to an 
immediate one.  Mazur (1987) used an adjusting-delay procedure in which he presented subjects 
(pigeons) with a small reinforcer immediately, or a larger reinforcer following a delay.  If the 
pigeons selected the key that produced the smaller reinforcer, the delay to the larger reinforcer 
was reduced.  Conversely, the delay increased if the pigeons selected the larger reinforcer.  The 




between the two options.  The procedure repeats with the smaller reinforcer being made 
available at several fixed-delay values. 
The more common method for assessing discounting with humans is an adjusting-amount 
procedure.  Rachlin, Raineri, and Cross (1991) conducted a study in which participants were 
presented with a choice between two hypothetical monetary outcomes of equal magnitude, one 
immediate and one delayed, a condition in which they preferred the immediate of the two 
options.  The amount of the immediate reward decreased across subsequent trials and an 
ascending sequence of amounts was implemented.  The indifference point was the average of the 
two values at which participants switched preference from immediate to delayed (descending) 
and from delayed to immediate (ascending).   
Other variations on the adjusting-amount procedure have also been reported.  The 
adjustment of the amount of the immediate alternative can occur in ascending, descending, or 
random order (e.g., Robles & Vargas, 2007).  So that participants are not required to respond to a 
large number of option pairs as is the case in the above procedures, researchers developed 
several abbreviated procedures.  Du, Green, and Myerson (2002) titrated the amount of the 
immediate monetary reward based on the participant’s previous choice.  Their procedure began 
by presenting a larger, delayed option and a smaller immediate option that was 50% of the value 
of the large option. The amount of the immediate option increased by 50% if the delayed option 
was chosen or decreased by 50% if the immediate option was chosen.  Subsequent adjustments 
to the smaller amount were equal to 50% of the previous adjustment.  This procedure is referred 
to as a titrating-amount procedure subsequently to differentiate it from fixed-sequence, adjusting-
amount procedures.  These procedures arrive at an indifference point more rapidly than 




above or below the midpoint.  If a participant prefers an option worth half of the delayed value 
when it is available immediately, one may presume that he or she would also prefer any larger 
amount provided immediately as well.  Finally, the Monetary Choice Questionnaire (Kirby & 
Marakovic, 1996; Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999) provides an efficient means by which to obtain 
an estimate of discounting using only 27 questions.  Each question poses a choice between a 
smaller, immediate option and a larger, delayed option.  The nominal values of both options and 
the value of the delay vary across questions.  The rate at which participants discount delayed 
rewards is then estimated through an analysis of their choices. 
 The above procedures with humans present participants with hypothetical alternatives.  
Whether participants’ responses to hypothetical scenarios resemble responding under real 
conditions in which participants receive the chosen reward has been the subject of several 
studies.  For example, Kirby and Marakovic (1996) used a lottery system to increase the 
likelihood that participants would respond as though the consequences were real, rather than 
hypothetical.  That is, they told participants there was a chance one of the outcomes they selected 
would actually be delivered.  Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, and de Wit (1999) also informed 
participants one of their selections would be delivered at the end of the experiment.  The results 
of both studies closely resembled findings of studies using hypothetical tasks.  In addition, 
human responding on hypothetical discounting tasks parallels responding by non-human animals 
exposed to selected consequences (e.g., Critchfield & Kollins, 2001). 
Empirically determining the discounted value of a reward or an outcome at several delays 
generates a discounting curve that illustrates the effect of delay on subjective value.  Commonly, 
a mathematical function is fitted to the indifference points obtained to generate a curve 




differs depending on the scientific perspective taken.  From the traditional economic perspective, 
the subjective value of a commodity decreases as a function of the delay to its receipt, and this 
decrease occurs at a constant rate (e.g., Samuelson, 1937).  The subjective value of a commodity 
over a range of temporal delays, then, would take the form of an exponential decay function 
given by 
    Equation 1. 
where VD is the subjective value of the delayed outcome, A is the objective amount, k is a 
constant that specifies the rate at which the value is discounted, and D is the delay to receipt 
(Mazur, 1997).  Any model of discounting must also account for reversals in preference that 
occur in studies of discounting.  Thaler (1981) describes this consistent pattern in human choice 
as dynamic inconsistency in which delays of equal magnitude affect choice differently.  He gives 
an example of two pairs of choices involving apples available after a delay.  One pair of options 
is between an apple in one year and two apples in one year plus one day.  The second pair is a 
choice between one apple today and two apples tomorrow.  Despite the difference in the delay to 
receiving the larger of the two options in both pairs being objectively equal (i.e., one day), 
people tend to respond differently to the two scenarios. 
When the exponential model assumes that the discounting rate (k) is equal across both the 
smaller and larger rewards, it does not predict these reversals in preference and subjective value 
(e.g., Rachlin, 2000).  However, Green and Myerson (1993) argue k varies inversely with amount 
and if an amount-dependent k is used, the exponential function can predict preference reversals.  
The literature has also proposed other models that both predict dynamic inconsistency and 
provide better fits to empirical data.  One such model is a hyperbola as 




with the parameters being the same as Equation 1 (Mazur, 1997).  The hyperbolic equation 
describes empirical discounting data substantially better than an exponential decay function 
(Madden & Johnson, 2010).  In addition to the objectively better fit, the hyperbolic equation also 
predicts the reversals of preference (i.e., dynamic inconsistency) described above.  When the 
choice is temporally delayed as in the choice between one year and one year plus one day, 
preference tends to be greater for the higher magnitude reward, despite that option being slightly 
more delayed.  However, at a certain point in time as the choice becomes temporally proximal, 
preference reverses and more selections of the smaller, but sooner reward occur (Green & 
Myerson, 2004).  Others have proposed that the addition of a psychophysical scaling parameter 
to the hyperbolic equation provides improved fits of empirical data.  The scaling parameter is 
either added to the denominator of the hyperbolic equation (e.g., Myerson & Green, 1995) 
	       Equation 3. 
or just the delay (e.g., Rachlin, 2006) 
	      Equation 4. 
The s parameter is proposed to represent the psychophysical scaling of amount and time 
(Equation 3) or just time (Equation 4) and has been shown to be relatively stable within 
participants (e.g., McKerchar, Green, & Myerson, 2010; Myerson & Green, 1995) whereas k 
varies with amount. 
 In an inductive science, experimenters obtain empirical measures of a phenomenon and 
then seek a model that adequately accounts for the data observed.  To this end, measures of fit 
can inform the choice of one of the several available models of temporal discounting.  However, 
model selection based on goodness-of-fit for each individual data set presents a problem for 




compare rates of discounting using the k parameter.  However, the addition of another parameter 
means that k cannot be used to compare discounting across subjects or conditions unless s is held 
constant.  The alternative is to use a one-parameter model, but in either case, these lead to 
sacrifices in the degree to which the models fit the empirical data.  Two alternative methods have 
been proposed to overcome this experimental limitation.  Myerson, Green, and Warusawitharana 
(2001) calculated the area under discounting curves using the formula 
∑ 	 	     Equation 5. 
which takes the area of the trapezoid formed by two adjacent points.  Higher AUC values 
represent shallower discounting, or, less sensitivity to delay.  Alternatively, Franck, Koffarnus, 
House, and Bickel (2015) propose an objective method for selecting the best model for each data 
set and yielding an index of discounting comparable across data sets regardless of which model 
is used.  First, the experimenter selects a set of models to compare.  Using an information 
criterion (e.g., Bayesian information criterion, BIC) the probabilities that each model fits the data 
best are compared and the most probable model is selected and fit to the data.  Because different 
models may be selected for each data set, differences in the number of parameters prohibit 
comparisons based on k values.  Instead, the effective delay 50% (ED50) is calculated as the 
delay value at which the subjective value of the delayed reward is 50% of the objective value 
(Yoon & Higgins, 2008).  Using ED50, lower values indicate steeper discounting compared to 
larger values. 
 Similar mathematical models also describe the discounting of outcomes as a function of 
effort. Grossbard and Mazur (1986) used an adjusting-effort procedure with pigeons.  Choosing 
one alternative resulted in 6 s of access to grain contingent upon the completion of a fixed-ratio 




upon a richer ratio schedule of reinforcement.  If the pigeon displayed a preference for the less 
effortful option, the response requirement was subsequently increased.  Conversely, if the pigeon 
displayed a preference for the more effortful alternative that resulted in more access to grain, 
then the response requirement for the less effortful alternative decreased.  Although the authors 
did not plot hyperbolic discounting curves as a function of effort, when they plotted the ratio 
schedule for the larger reinforcer as a function of the ratio requirement for the smaller reinforcer, 
a linear relation was obtained, which is predicted through a derivation of the hyperbolic equation.  
A second study used an adjusting-amount procedure with Japanese students in which an 
effortful, but larger option was paired with a smaller, effortless option (Sugiwaka & Okouchi, 
2004).  The amount of the effortless option changed across trials in an ascending sequence to 
identify the point of indifference.  The authors concluded the hyperbolic model well-described 
discounting of monetary rewards as a function of the effort required to obtain the larger reward.  
Reed and colleagues (Reed, DiGennaro Reed, Chok, & Brozyna, 2011; Reed, Kaplan, & Brewer, 
2012) have also described a special case of effort discounting on the basis of search costs.  A 
phenomenon called choice overload suggests having too much choice becomes aversive despite 
the typical preference for choice over conditions of limited choice.  Participants preferred 
extensive options initially when presented with a choice between a single option, limited options, 
and extensive options.  When the number of options was increased across trials, preference 
shifted to limited options. 
Discounting may also apply when the outcomes are shared with someone other than the 
subject.  Jones and Rachlin (2006) asked participants to imagine they had created a list of 100 
people ordered from closest friend or relative to a distant acquaintance.  Participants then 




them or a larger amount of money shared with a person on the list of varying social distance.  A 
hyperbolic function fit the plot of maximum amounts of money forgone in exchange for 
obtaining the smaller amount of money for one’s self suggesting the same function that describes 
delay also describes social discounting. 
 Probability discounting.  The mode of discounting most relevant to the present 
investigation is probability.  The following is a brief background on probability discounting, 
followed by a review of studies most relevant to organizational settings (i.e., probability 
discounting of monetary and non-monetary rewards by typical adults).  A large portion of the 
literature has focused on discounting within the context of addiction and pathological gambling 
(e.g., Bickel et al., 2012).  Because this literature supports differences in how gamblers and 
individuals using addictive substances discount outcomes compared to individuals without 
documented pathologies, studies focused on pathological discounting are excluded from this 
review.  The literature search procedure and inclusionary criteria are provided in Appendix A. 
Prospect theory, proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), describes discrepancies 
between the rational, economic view of utility and consistent violations of rationality in 
empirical studies of utility.  When faced with a risky prospect, the expected utility (i.e., rational 
evaluation of risk) of a commodity is given as the nominal value of the outcomes weighted by 
their probability.  For example, the utility of $100 with a probability of 0.50 is given by 
(0.50)$100 + (0.50)$0 = $50.  Utility plotted over a range of probabilities using expected utility 
would take the form 
    Equation 6. 
where p is the probability and A is the nominal amount of the outcome.  However, the manner in 




rational decision making (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1980).  Rather, additional 
factors influence decision weights when faced with risky prospects.  For example, people tend to 
overweight lower probabilities and underweight higher probabilities.  The difference between a 
prospect with a 0% probability and 5% is greater than the difference between the same prospect 
at 50% or 55% (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).  Parallel to the finding that discounting delayed 
consequences is hyperbolic, research has supported hyperbola-like discounting of probabilistic 
outcomes (e.g., Rachlin et al., 1991). 
 The similarity in form between probability and temporal discounting led to hypotheses 
that delay and probability are examples of the same process, such as impulsivity (e.g., Green, 
Myerson, Oliveira, & Chang, 2014). For example, temporal discounting of outcomes may be a 
function of a reduced expectancy that the outcome will actually be obtained (e.g., Mahrer, 1956), 
which would suggest that temporal discounting is a case of probability discounting.  Rachlin, 
Logue, Gibbon, and Frankel (1986) propose the inverse.  Organisms with a history of repeated 
gambles may interpret uncertain outcomes as delayed outcomes.  For example, if a gamble has a 
20% probability of producing a reward, it will require five responses on average before the 
reward is obtained, which would delay the outcome more than a more certain gamble.  
Rachlin et al. (1991) presented undergraduate participants with either a temporal or 
probability discounting task using an adjusting-amount procedure with both an ascending and 
descending sequence of amounts for the immediate or certain options.  The authors tested seven 
delay and probability values with an ascending sequence of delays and descending sequence of 
probabilities. The hyperbolic functions described the obtained data well.  For temporal 
discounting, Equation 2 was shown to provide an excellent fit (r2 = .995) of the group data.  An 




	     Equation 7.  
where θ is the odds against an outcome as (1/p) – 1.  Equation 7 produced better fits of the data 
than an exponential decay function (Equation 1 with θ in place of k) extending the similar 
finding in temporal discounting research.  In a second study, participants chose between a 
probabilistic amount of money and an equal amount of delayed money.  The delays changed 
across trials to find a point of equivalence between delay and probability.  Plotting the points of 
equivalence revealed a proportionality between h and k parameters in the discounting functions.  
Taken together, the formal similarity of the probability and temporal discounting functions and 
the proportionality of the parameters suggest probability and delay correspond in their effects on 
subjective value.  Mathematical similarity does not provide direct evidence for or against the 
hypothesis that probability affects value as a function of the waiting time before the delivery of a 
reward, however.  Although Equation 7 is commonly used in the behavioral discounting 
literature, a recent cross-disciplinary study concluded that other models may provide better 
descriptions of discounting, but the differences were small (Takahashi, Oono, & Radford, 2007).   
Rachlin and Siegel (1994) provided a more direct analysis of whether temporal and 
probability discounting are related processes.  The experimenters gave participants the choice to 
spin one of two spinners, each with a difference chance to produce a monetary reward.  They 
programmed the probability by changing the number of white tiles around the outside of the 
spinner.  One spinner produced $0.10 with a probability of 17/18 (17 white tiles, one black tile) 
while the other produced $0.25 with a varying probability that was adjusted across trials.  Across 
groups, the inter-trial interval (ITI) differed, either imposing an ITI following each spin, or 
permitting several spins before the ITI.  Preference shifts across groups differed.  Given that all 




cannot be independent of temporal factors.  Generally, risky options were less preferred when 
ITI length was higher. Again, the authors concluded the results do not fully support the function 
of time in risky decision-making, but argued a theory of probability discounting would need to 
include time as a factor to explain their findings. 
 Navarick (1987) manipulated delay, probability, and reward magnitude in a human 
operant chamber with two buttons operating on concurrent chains.  Pressing a button resulted in 
the programmed schedule taking effect, presenting the reward (projected images) with a varying 
probability, delay, and/or duration.  Varying only probability or amount, participants preferred 
the certain option or longer reward duration, respectively.  Two groups chose between options 
differing on all three schedule parameters.  Participants demonstrated a stronger preference for 
an option that was immediate and certain over one that was uncertain and delayed but longer in 
duration.  However, participants also preferred an uncertain, larger option when it was immediate 
over one that was certain but delayed.  The patterns obtained resembled a choice between 
gambling over placing money in a savings account.  That is, the former is an uncertain but 
immediate outcome whereas the latter is certain but substantially delayed, adding face validity to 
discounting as a mechanism of impulsivity.  Navarick also concluded the results are more 
parsimoniously interpreted with delay and probability being independent parameters in contrast 
to Rachlin et al. (1986). 
 The aforementioned studies provide some evidence that delay and probability interact in 
choice arrangements.  However, the effect of manipulating reward amount differs in studies of 
temporal and probability discounting.  In the former, individuals discount rewards of larger 
magnitudes less steeply and the outcomes retain more value as delay increases (e.g., Green, 




effect in the inverse direction with probability discounting.  Green, Myerson, and Ostaszewski 
(1999) collected both temporal and probability discounting measures from 68 Polish 
undergraduate students to examine whether the same mathematical function describes both.  In 
addition, they posited, if both forms of discounting share a process, experimental manipulations 
of the discounting tasks should affect subjective value similarly across modes of discounting.  
Participants completed an adjusting-amount discounting task for both temporal and probability 
discounting twice.  During one administration, the value of the delayed or uncertain monetary 
outcome was $500 and during the other, it was $10,000.  The results indicated the two-
parameter, hyperbola-like model (Equation 3 above with θ substituted for k for probability 
discounting) accounted for over 99% of variance for both forms of discounting. Participants 
discounted the delayed receipt of $10,000 less steeply than $500, replicating the magnitude 
effect described above.  However, participants discounted $10,000 more than $500 when the 
outcomes were probabilistic.  In a second study, $200, $5,000, and $100,000 rewards were 
compared and the same findings were replicated with the hyperbola-like model accounting for 
more than 98% of the variance.  Rachlin, Brown, and Cross (2000) obtained similar results with 
amounts ranging from $10 to $1,000,000.  Despite procedural differences, the hyperbolic 
function well described subjective value.  Comparing data obtained for larger amounts to smaller 
amounts, discounting was steeper for uncertain rewards.  To date, several studies have replicated 
the effect of magnitude in probability discounting (Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2006; Estle, 
Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007; Mitchell & Wilson, 2010; Myerson, Green, Hanson, Holt, & 
Estle, 2003; Ostaszewski & Bialaszek, 2010; Rachlin et al., 2000; Weatherly & Derenne, 2013; 




In their evaluation of the effect of amount on probability discounting, Myerson, Green, 
and Morris (2011) proposed the effect of amount primarily influences the exponent s rather than 
h in the probability discounting function.  This is in contrast to findings in temporal discounting 
where s is constant over both delays and amounts while k varies (e.g., Estle et al., 2006).  That is, 
s is representative of the psychophysical scaling of amount and delay and describes how a given 
individual perceives differences in these variables (e.g., Stevens, 1957).  When Myerson et al. 
(2011) plotted parameter fits of the hyperboloid model against amount, they found only s 
significantly correlated with amount.  This finding suggests s is not a scaling parameter for 
amount, but rather reflects the weighting of the odds against an outcome.  Myerson et al. argue 
this interpretation is consistent with the decision weighting aspect of prospect theory (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979).  That is, s may describe the weight an individual gives to a given probability 
in relation to the amount at stake. 
Collectively, the differences between temporal and probability discounting suggest they 
do not share the same underlying mechanism.  A large-scale study by Jarmolowicz, Bickel, 
Carter, Franck, and Mueller (2012) provided further evidence that while similar mathematical 
functions describe the two modes of discounting, they are likely to be separate processes.  They 
recruited 904 participants using Amazon Mechanical Turk.  The participants completed sets of 
Monetary Choice Questionnaires for both temporal and probability discounting.  They found the 
rate parameters k and h were only weakly correlated.  The correlation was also in the opposite 
direction one might expect.  Shead and Hodgins (2009) provide an interpretation of probability 
discounting that parallels the impulsivity interpretation of temporal discounting.  Compared to 
the expected value of a prospect (i.e., the rational value of a risky outcome described by 




and subjective values less than expected value represent risk-aversion.  A negative correlation 
between rates of discounting across delay and probability would be expected if both modes of 
discounting are manifestations of impulsivity (intolerance for delay and accepting risk).  The 
positive correlation found reveals participants who were impatient also tended to be risk-averse.  
A principal component analysis yielded two factors rather than one further adding to the 
conclusion that temporal and probability discounting are not results of impulsivity (see also 
Green et al., 2014). 
Despite this evidence for differing processes, researchers have found many variables that 
influence rates of temporal discounting also have an effect on rates of probability discounting.  
For example, several studies have shown the discounting of losses differs from that of gains.  
Shead and Hodgins (2006) presented participants with both a probability discounting of gains 
task as well as one for losses, both using a titrating-amount procedure. A correlational analysis 
revealed a negative, but not significant, correlation between probability discounting of gains and 
losses.  The probability of replicating the negative correlation in 2000 resamples (prep; Killeen, 
2005) was .97 making it a relatively robust finding.  The authors concluded individuals who 
discount gains steeply tend to discount losses less steeply (risk-aversion) and vice versa (risk-
seeking). 
Mitchell and Wilson (2010) reported similar findings, but also manipulated the amount of 
probabilistic gain and loss.  They divided participants into four groups, each completing four 
discounting tasks.  One group completed a gain and loss task with both $10 and $100.  
Participants discounted probabilistic gains more steeply than losses and larger gains more steeply 
than smaller gains.  No effect of amount was obtained for losses.  Estle et al. (2006) examined 




strong effect of amount on uncertain gains, but not losses.  Green et al. (2014) obtained 
discounting measures for uncertain losses over a wide range of amounts from $20 to $500,000 
and found amount had no systematic effect on discounting.  Because amount also had no effect 
on delayed losses, the authors concluded discounting of gains in either mode does not predict 
discounting of losses.  At the individual level, there appeared to be three distinct patterns of 
discounting: delayed gains, uncertain gains, and amount-insensitive discounting of losses. 
Two studies took a novel approach to the effects of gains versus losses in probability 
discounting.  Ostaszewski and Bialaszek (2010) combined gains and losses in outcomes that 
participants either chose to accept or reject as a pair.  For example, they told participants if they 
chose to take a certain gain, there was a chance they may also incur a loss or a certain loss may 
also result in a gain.  In both conditions, the uncertain amount of gain or loss was either 900PLN 
(Polish Zloty currency) or 9,000PLN and the certain amount was adjusted in either an ascending 
or descending sequence.  The authors used four probability values from 5% to 95% in a 
descending sequence.  They defined subjective value as the amount of the certain option at the 
point where participants switched from accepting the offer to rejecting it.  In this method, the 
subjective value represents the amount of certain gain that would compensate for the risk of loss 
or the amount of certain loss that participants would tolerate to have the chance for a gain.  The 
two-parameter hyperboloid model (Equation 3) fit the group median indifference points well.  
AUC was also calculated and for the certain-loss, uncertain-gain condition, AUC was smaller for 
the larger amount (the larger amount was discounted more steeply) replicating the effect of 
amount in previous studies.  In the certain-gain, uncertain-loss condition, AUC values for both 




Weatherly and Derenne (2013) framed gains and losses as either winning a sweepstakes 
or failing to be repaid money that is owed.  In the gains condition, participants received a 
scenario in which there was a chance they may win a prize in a sweepstakes, but they may 
choose to accept a smaller, guaranteed amount of money instead.  In the loss condition, the 
scenario presented was one in which someone owed the participant money, but there was a 
chance they would not be able to repay it.  Alternatively, participants could choose to accept a 
certain amount of money less than the amount owed.  The experimenters tested two uncertain 
amounts—$1,000 and $100,000—in each condition.  Across two experiments, participants were 
either asked to select a certain amount they would accept in lieu of the uncertain amount 
(multiple-choice) or give the minimum amount they would accept (fill-in-the-blank).  Comparing 
gains to losses using the frame of won and owed money, the results revealed owed money was 
discounted less steeply than won money, further extending the findings on the effects of 
gain/loss framing. 
The literature on probability discounting has also described several other variables that 
affect rates of probability discounting.  For example, Dai, Grace, and Kemp (2009) obtained a 
reward contrast effect on subjective value in which being presented with a discounting task 
involving either a small or large amount affected the degree to which an intermediate-size reward 
was discounted.  In a first experiment, two groups of participants completed four discounting 
tasks each.  One group completed a discounting task with a probabilistic amount of $5,000 and 
then a second task in which the probabilistic amount was $500.  The first standard amount for the 
other group was $50, with the second standard amount also being $500.  Each group also 
completed temporal discounting tasks with the same amounts.  The results for the initial standard 




steeply than $50.  The authors compared discounting across groups for the $500 reward.  When 
$500 followed $5,000 as a standard amount, the former was discounted less steeply than when 
$500 followed $50.  The direction of this effect is expected based on the direction of the 
magnitude effect in probability discounting.  Notably, the effect of reward contrast was in the 
opposite direction for temporal discounting tasks, a difference also expected given the direction 
of the magnitude effect in temporal discounting.  In a second experiment, Dai et al. replicated 
these findings using a within-subjects comparison in which participants completed discounting 
tasks with standard amounts being $50 and $5,000.  Following each task, participants completed 
a probe to obtain an indifference point for only a probability of 70% and an intermediate 
standard amount. 
The subjective value of delayed and probabilistic outcomes is commonly reported as the 
amount of an immediate or certain outcome that is subjectively equivalent and is derived from 
procedures in which participants make a series of choices between two options.  However, Hsee, 
Zhang, Wang, and Zhang (2013) argue individuals do not always encounter delayed and 
probabilistic outcomes as a choice scenario.  Rather, individuals must sometimes decide whether 
to accept a single outcome of a given value that may be delayed or uncertain.  The authors 
compared discounting in situations of joint evaluation with two options available for comparison, 
and single evaluation, in which participants had only one option and reported how acceptable 
that option was.  In one experiment, the experimenters told participants they had 120 min of free 
time during which they might choose to wait in line to receive a $50 gift certificate.  The 
probability of obtaining the gift certificate was either 100%, 90%, or 80%.  Participants assigned 
to one of the three single evaluation groups were presented with only one of the three 




Participants in the joint evaluation group were presented with all three probability levels at the 
same time and asked to report how much time they would wait in line for each of the scenarios.  
The results revealed participants in single evaluation were less sensitive to the degree of 
uncertainty than those in joint evaluation.  Specifically, participants in single evaluation reported 
they would wait about as long in the 80% scenario as those in joint evaluation reported they 
would wait in the 90% scenario.  Both groups were equally sensitive to the difference between 
90% and 100%.  At the other end of the probability spectrum (impossibility), similar results were 
obtained.  Participants in the single evaluation group were willing to wait about as long in the 
10% and 20% scenarios while participants responded differently to joint options.  
Hsee et al. (2013) also hypothesized when individuals have one option, discounting 
would be relatively insensitive to the magnitude of the outcome while magnitude would affect 
decisions in joint evaluation.  In two experiments, participants were presented either with two 
scenarios jointly (joint evaluation), or one of those two options alone (single evaluation).  One 
option was smaller and riskless while the other was large and risky.  The results supported their 
hypothesis as single evaluation participants reported stronger preference for the riskless option 
while the joint evaluation participants preferred the larger, risky option.  The authors concluded 
that when evaluated alone, the risk affects acceptability more than magnitude and the opposite is 
true for joint evaluations. 
Another effect of option framing was reported by Jones and Oaksford (2011).  They 
argue gains and losses of commodities in studies of discounting do not resemble the context in 
which individuals might typically encounter them.  Specifically, commodities are gained or lost 
in a transaction where one exchanges something for the commodity.  To determine whether the 




participants with a discounting task in which they chose between two ways to pay for some 
commodity that was already received.  The options included an amount that would be paid for 
certain and a probability that a larger amount would be paid.  Participants completed the task 
with uncertain amounts of $200, $2,500, and $15,000 and five probabilities between 10% and 
90%.  In each scenario, the authors told participants they had already received the item they are 
paying for and that to assume they have enough money to pay for the item in either option.  The 
authors reported subjective points of indifference between the options varied as a function of 
odds against paying the larger amount.  A significant effect of amount was also obtained with the 
direction of the relation being the same as the standard magnitude effect in temporal discounting 
(i.e., larger costs were discounted less steeply than smaller costs).  As described above, the 
magnitude effect for uncertain gains is typically in the opposite direction compared to delayed 
gains.  However, amount did not affect losses in either modality.  The magnitude effect found by 
Jones and Oaksford, however, cannot be confidently attributed to the transactional content of the 
instructions as the same effect was obtained in another experiment in which transactional content 
was removed as a control.  The main difference between transactional and non-transactional 
conditions was that discounting in the latter was less steep.  The authors argue transactional 
content influences probability discounting by adding an implicit benefit to the uncertain loss.  
That is, the loss is balanced against the gain of obtaining the commodity for which payment is 
being considered.  Choosing the uncertain payment option adds to the benefit of obtaining the 
commodity through the possibility that the gain could be had with no cost.  These results contrast 





The framing of options may also have an effect on how individuals discount gains.  Yi 
and Bickel (2005) argued many studies in probability discounting present options as one-time 
decisions, meaning the value of the uncertain outcome is either nothing or the full amount of the 
reward.  When presented with risky prospects as one-time gambles, probability discounting 
deviates from expected value, but the availability of repeated gambles has been shown to 
increase the degree to which subjective value resembles an expected value function (Yi & 
Bickel, 2005).  Information about probability may also be presented in terms of relative 
frequencies (e.g., 25% is 1 of 4).  The purpose of the study by Yi and Bickel, therefore, was to 
determine what effect expressing probability as a relative frequency in a one-shot choice would 
have on discounting compared to expressing the same information as a percentage.  In addition, 
participants completed a discounting task in which they chose between a smaller certain amount 
of money and ten chances—expressed as a frequency—to obtain a larger amount of money (i.e., 
repeated gambles).  The authors held expected value constant across conditions by altering the 
amounts in the repeated gambles condition.  Participants responded differently to the three tasks 
(one-shot percentage, one-shot frequency, and repeated frequency).  With probabilities stated as 
a relative frequency, discounting occurred less steeply than when expressed as a percentage.  A 
significant difference was obtained between the one-shot frequency and one-shot percentage 
conditions.  The mean h value for the repeated gambles condition fell between the other two 
conditions, but the difference failed to reach significance.  The authors argued the difference 
obtained does not invalidate procedures that express probability as a percentage, but that 
individuals may interpret or process frequencies differently. 
Another series of studies evaluated the combination of probability and delay in 




discounting of outcomes that are both delayed and uncertain.  Participants completed three tasks.  
One task was a standard temporal discounting task with the delayed amount being set at £100.  
Uncertainty was introduced as both uncertainty of the outcome occurring (e.g., a 50% chance of 
obtaining £200) and as uncertainty of the amount of the reward (i.e., a 100% chance of obtaining 
either £50, £100, or £150).  The authors presented the standard amounts described above along 
with a smaller, immediate, and certain monetary reward, which they adjusted across trials to 
converge at an indifference point.  Participants completed each of the three tasks with eight 
delays ranging from no delay to 10 yrs.  The authors suggested the hyperbolic model could 
describe discounting of both delayed and uncertain rewards.  However, the objective value used 
for A in Equation 2 must account for the presence of uncertainty in the options.  They compared 
using the expected value of the delayed reward, which would be £100 for both conditions with 
uncertainty, and an empirically derived certain equivalent as the value of A.  Participants 
indicated their certain equivalent of an uncertain £200 and a certain opportunity to obtain one of 
three reward amounts through indifference points when the outcomes were available with no 
delay.  The results showed using the certain equivalents for A resulted in better fits of the 
indifference points compared to using expected value.  The authors found the lowest rate of 
discounting under the uncertain reward amount condition using fits based on certain equivalents.  
A second study examined both the magnitude and outcome valence (gain vs. loss) using the same 
procedures.  Participants discounted gains more steeply than losses, and smaller gains more 
steeply than larger gains, with losses being insensitive to reward amount. 
Yi et al. (2006) took a different approach to characterizing the discounting of delayed and 
uncertain outcomes. They proposed if an outcome is both delayed and uncertain, the probability 




described by Rachlin et al. (1991).  Discounting can then be modeled using the resulting 
equivalent or composite delay.  Participants completed standard temporal and probability 
discounting tasks along with two combined tasks.  In one, participants were given a scenario in 
which they were given a lottery ticket with a known probability of winning, but the 
determination for whether the ticket was a winner would not be made until after a delay.  The 
immediate certain option was an amount of money paid by a lottery agent who would buy the 
ticket.  In the other combined condition, the lottery ticket had a known probability of winning 
and the determination would be made immediately, but the winnings would be delayed.  The 
authors found no significant differences between the two combined conditions.  In both 
combined conditions, the hyperbolic model using composite delay values provided good fits. 
Keren and Roelofsma (1995) suggested probability only affects how individuals discount 
delayed rewards at shorter delays.  Across groups, they gave participants a choice between 
smaller reward now and a larger reward in four weeks, where both outcomes had a probability of 
1.0, 0.9, or 0.5.  Other groups of participants had similar options, but the delays were 26 and 30 
weeks.  The effect of uncertainty at short delays was a shift from the majority of participants 
selecting the immediate reward when it was certain to the majority of participants selecting the 
reward delayed by 4 weeks when the probability was 0.5.  However, at longer delays, no 
substantial effect of uncertainty was obtained as the majority of participants already preferred the 
larger, more delayed option when the probability was 1.0. 
As in studies on other forms of discounting, many studies in probability discounting 
focus on the discounting of hypothetical, monetary rewards.  However, several studies provide 
evidence that discounting of hypothetical rewards bears resemblance to discounting when the 




discounting task using hypothetical outcomes and an identical task using real outcomes.  In both, 
participants made choices between two options with option A being 10 pence with a probability 
of 1.0, .75, .5, or .25 and option B being 20 pence with a lower probability than option A.  The 
probability of option B changed across trials (i.e., amount was not adjusted).  The procedure used 
visual representation of probabilities using graphical depictions of spinner wheels similar to 
those used in Rachlin et al. (1991) with a green segment indicating a win and a red segment 
indicating a loss.  After participants made a choice, a spinner was imposed on the wheel with a 
random orientation to determine whether the chosen reward would be delivered.  The authors 
found no significant difference between probability discounting of real or hypothetical rewards.  
However, there was an effect of sequence.  Participants tended to show a stronger preference for 
the larger amount (i.e., make riskier choices) when presented with hypothetical rewards first.  
Comparing the indifference points from the condition presented first across participants showed 
no significant differences in discounting, suggesting discounting measures do not differ between 
real and hypothetical outcomes.  Thus, the findings of studies on probability discounting using 
hypothetical rewards are likely to resemble choices made in the context of real, experienced 
outcomes. 
Another factor related to the generalizability of probability discounting is whether people 
discount other commodities similarly to money.  Several studies have examined probability 
discounting with non-monetary commodities.  Estle et al. (2007) compared discounting of money 
to candy, soft drinks, and beer.  Participants completed a series of discounting tasks following a 
titrating-amount procedure.  They indicated indifference points for each reward type at five 
probabilities and two reward amounts (40 units and 100 units).  For comparison, participants also 




in the rate at which participants discounted each reward type as a function of probability.  This 
finding was in contrast to those for temporal discounting in which participants discounted money 
less steeply than non-monetary rewards.  In addition, participants discounted larger rewards more 
steeply and less steeply for probability and delay, respectively. 
Holt, Newquist, Smits, and Tiry (2014) partially replicated these results, showing 
participants discounted smaller amounts of food and money at similar rates.  With larger 
amounts, however, participants discounted food less steeply than money.  The authors also 
extended the comparison between money and non-monetary rewards to include sexual outcomes 
(see also Lawyer, 2008).  For all three reward types, line segments represented relative quantities 
with the full length of the line being the ideal reward outcome and shorter lines being 
proportional magnitudes of the ideal.  Participants discounted sex substantially less steeply than 
both food and money at both magnitudes.  Notably, the authors also found no significant 
correlations between discounting rates for the three reward types.  This finding suggests 
discounting of one reward type would not be an accurate predictor for how an individual 
discounts other commodities. 
Further, discounting occurs as a function of probability for other commodities as well.  
One study examined responding in the context of a video game in which a tradeoff existed 
between probability and magnitude (Young, Webb, Rung, & McCoy, 2014).  Participants chose 
in real-time when to initiate an attack, the effect of which was determined by a progressively 
decreasing magnitude of effect but a concurrently increasing probability of effect, or vice versa.  
When the probability the action would be successful started at a low level and increased with 
waiting time, participants waited longer than the optimal amount of time, showing a preference 




participants discounted years of health as a function of probability when they were offered two 
hypothetical drugs, one that would extend the participant’s life by a small number of years for 
certain and another that had a probability of extending life by more years.  Kaplan, Reed, and 
McKerchar (2014) applied a discounting paradigm to environmental issues by asking 
participants to indicate how concerned and how willing they would be to help when presented 
with scenarios involving environmental losses.  The hyperbolic model described the decrease in 
both and willingness to help was discounted more steeply than concern as a function of 
probability, delay, and social distance. 
Taken together, the literature in probability discounting shows a robust effect of 
probability in decision-making across a variety of formats and commodities.  A recent branch of 
this research has aimed to address one limitation with the studies described so far.  Specifically, 
probability discounting studies typically determine a quantity or value of some certain 
commodity that is subjectively equivalent to the same commodity under conditions of 
uncertainty.  However, real life choices often involve some tradeoff between two different 
commodities such as the choice between using drugs and being able to earn or save money (e.g., 
Bickel et al., 2011).  To more closely examine these choice scenarios termed cross-commodity 
discounting, studies have determined an equivalence between two commodities using similar 
procedures as single-commodity discounting studies. 
Mitchell (2004) recruited smokers to complete a series of discounting tasks both under 
conditions of normal use and nicotine deprivation.  Three discounting tasks involved choices 
between monetary options that differed in delay, probability, and effort using an adjusting-
amount procedure.  In addition, participants also completed three similar tasks using the same 




cigarettes.  The experimenter selected one choice from the money-money tasks and one from the 
cigarette-money tasks at random and the chosen option was delivered to increase the likelihood 
participants would respond as if all options were being presented for real.  A hyperbolic function 
was fitted to the indifference points for all six tasks.  The authors did not report measures of fit 
for the regression, but inspection of the figures suggests indifference points decreased in a 
curvilinear fashion as a function of delay, probability, and effort in both money-money tasks and 
cigarette-money tasks.  Acute nicotine deprivation affected discounting for cigarette-money 
tasks, but not money-money tasks.  Most relevantly, though, was the demonstration that the 
subjective value of one commodity (money) can be described in terms of another commodity 
(cigarettes).  The general shape of the discounting curve generated by discounting across 
commodities appears to remain hyperbolic.  Yoon, Higgins, Bradstreet, Badger, and Thomas 
(2009) used a cross-commodity delay discounting task based on the procedures described by 
Mitchell in their examination of an abstinence program and found that the hyperbolic model fit 
well with r2 values over .8. 
Bickel et al. (2011) noted a flaw with the two cross-commodity discounting studies above 
in that they did not examine discounting for both commodities and in all combinations.  Thus, 
one cannot draw conclusions regarding whether the type of commodities available in a choice 
scenario affects discounting.  That is, rates of discounting when only non-monetary rewards are 
available both immediately or after a delay may not resemble discounting when the delayed 
commodity is either monetary or non-monetary.  Bickel et al. presented participants with four 
discounting tasks representing all possible combinations of two commodities, money and 
cocaine: two single-commodity tasks pairing immediate and delayed commodities of the same 




immediate money with delayed cocaine.  The authors used the titrating-amount procedure for all 
tasks.  To determine the range of amounts for cocaine as the immediate option, participants 
indicated in grams how much cocaine they would find to be subjectively equivalent to receiving 
$1,000.  The authors concluded the type of commodity presented at the delayed option affected 
the rate of discounting.  When money was the delayed outcome, rates of discounting were less 
steep than when cocaine was the delayed commodity.  In a study using similar methods, 
Jarmolowicz et al. (2014) assessed single- and cross-commodity discounting of money and sex.  
For men, they obtained results similar to Bickel et al. (2011) suggesting delayed cocaine and sex 
do not retain value to the same degree as money. 
Together, findings in cross-commodity discounting suggest the subjective values of 
commodities or outcomes vary systematically as a function of delay and probability and that 
these results hold whether individuals have a choice between identical or different commodities.  
Cross-commodity discounting may have particular relevance to illuminating how individuals 
make choices between options when a trade-off exists between them.  To date, studies in cross-
commodity discounting have focused on commodities with implications for health 
(cigarettes/cocaine/sex now vs. delayed financial or physical health).  However, such trade-offs 
exist in many other forms.  Practitioners of performance management recognize immediate and 
certain consequences have much more reliable effects on behavior than those that are delayed or 
uncertain (e.g., Daniels, 1994).  These outcomes compete with naturally occurring, concurrently 
available contingencies.  Employees may allocate behavior to contingencies that require less 
effort and provide positive consequences that are immediate and certain to occur due to a 
devaluation of longer-term consequences that may not come to pass.  Envision an employee who 




company performance initiative or towards less productive behaviors (e.g., surfing the internet, 
checking social media updates, taking a coffee break, conversing with fellow employees).  The 
subjective value of a monetary incentive may be reduced by the delay to, or probability of, its 
receipt to a degree where it no longer serves as a viable consequence in competition with other 
available reinforcers. 
Understanding how delay and probability affect the effectiveness of incentive systems 
might have significant implications for organizations (Jarmolowicz, Reed, DiGennaro Reed, & 
Bickel, in press).  If employees discount the value of incentives in orderly and predictable ways, 
an analysis of delay and probability might reveal why incentive systems fail.  In addition, 
organizations might be able to identify employees during the hiring process who are shallow 
discounters (i.e., individuals who do not discount uncertain outcomes at a high rate) who will 
respond well to a company’s incentives, or design incentive systems that maximize efficiency 
while maintaining effectiveness.  That is, approaching incentive schedules from a behavioral 
economic framework could identify the leanest incentive arrangement that is likely to be 
effective.  Before incorporating such considerations into practice, experimental investigation into 
discounting as a controlling factor in subjective valuation of incentives is warranted.  The present 
investigation is a first step in an attempt to synthesize considerations in organizational behavior 
management and behavioral economics in the context of performance incentives. 
The purpose of Experiment 1 is to extend the current findings in cross-commodity 
discounting to include a commodity relevant to organizational settings—the use of personal 
electronic devices—as one that might compete with less certain organizational outcomes.  
Because there are many contingencies operating in workplace settings that may influence 




outcomes as occurring in the context of a workplace.  Such a framing may affect discounting by 
the addition of implicit negative reinforcement contingencies endemic to work such as avoidance 
of progressive discipline or loss of compensation.  Finally, Experiment 3 examines the effect of 
manipulating the subjective value of performance bonuses through probability on the 
performance of a simulated work task in a human-operant laboratory model of a probabilistic 
incentive system.   
Experiment 1: Hypothetical Cross-Commodity Discounting of Currency and Leisure 
Activity 
Method 
 Participants, setting, and apparatus.  Participants included 57 undergraduate students 
enrolled in introductory-level courses in applied behavioral science.  Participants completed the 
discounting assessment on Dell® OptiPlex computers in a testing lab measuring 9 m by 6 m.  
Each computer was placed on a desk and was equipped with a wide-aspect, flat-panel monitor, 
standard keyboard, and mouse.  A series of discounting measures were presented by a computer 
program written in Microsoft® Visual Basic.Net.  The discounting measures were developed 
based on procedures reported by Johnson and Bickel (2002) and Du et al. (2002).  For each trial, 
the program presented two options to participants consisting of two buttons with text displayed 
side-by-side.  The left button displayed a smaller, certain reward and the right button displayed a 
larger, probabilistic reward.  Participants indicated their preferred option by clicking on one of 
the buttons.  Following a response, the buttons dimmed on the screen and became non-
responsive for a period of 2 s before the next option was presented.  Centered below the buttons 
was a third button that allowed participants to return to the beginning of a trial block if they 




A trial block included six trials consisting of options between a certain reward and an 
uncertain reward at a given probability.  After the participant made six choices, the same options 
were presented again using a different probability for the uncertain reward.  Participants 
responded to an attending question at the beginning of each trial block requiring them to type the 
probability value of the uncertain option.  Participants could not continue until typing the correct 
response.  For each trial, the uncertain reward value was the undiscounted value, which was 
generated by participants during a pre-assessment questionnaire.  At the start of each trial block, 
the certain reward value was presented as 50% of the undiscounted value.  Depending on the 
participants’ choice, the certain reward value was either increased or decreased using a titrating-
amount algorithm described by Du et al. (2002).  If the participant chose the certain reward on 
the first trial, the certain reward value presented on the next trial was decreased by 50%.  If the 
participant chose the uncertain reward, the certain reward value was increased by 50%.  For each 
subsequent trial, the amount by which the certain reward value was adjusted was 50% of the 
previous adjustment amount.  For each condition, participants completed seven trial blocks with 
each block presenting a different probability level for the uncertain reward including 5%, 10%, 
25%, 50%, 75%, 90%, and 95%.  Probabilities were tested in either an ascending or descending 
order, determined by random assignment. 
 Dependent measure.  The primary dependent measure for the present study was the 
indifference point between the certain and probabilistic rewards presented during the task.  An 
indifference point represents the value of the certain reward that is subjectively equivalent to the 
value of the uncertain reward.  This value was recorded as the adjusted amount of the certain 
reward value presented during the sixth trial in a trial block (i.e., the adjustment algorithm was 




 Procedures.  The computer program presented a prompt for participants to review an 
information and informed consent statement provided in hard copy by the experimenter.  Two 
buttons corresponding to agreement to consent and disagreement to consent were displayed 
below the prompt on the left and right, respectively.  No participants refused consent.  After 
consenting to participate, participants completed a three-question pre-assessment questionnaire 
on the computer (Appendix C).  The questions were adapted from Bickel et al. (2011) and were 
used to obtain a point of equivalence between the two commodities.  First, participants specified 
(by selecting or typing) a leisure activity they most commonly consume on a mobile device 
during a typical day.  Second, participants used a slider to indicate how much time (as a 
proportion of 24 hrs) they spend engaging in the activity they chose.  Finally, participants 
indicated an amount of money that would be subjectively equivalent to having access to their 
chosen leisure activity for the amount of time they indicated in a given day.  Once participants 
responded to all three questions and the program validated their responses, the computer 
presented the main discounting task. 
 Participants completed four discounting tasks, each comparing hypothetical monetary 
rewards, access to leisure activities on a mobile device, or a combination of the two.  For each 
condition, the uncertain reward was presented as the undiscounted value of either access to a 
mobile device (from question two of the pre-assessment questionnaire) or the undiscounted value 
of equivalent money (question three of the pre-assessment questionnaire) and remained constant 
across trials.  For certain rewards, the initial amount was 50% of the undiscounted amount and 
was adjusted across trials as described previously.  Two of the conditions were single-




leisure) and two were cross-commodity discounting tasks (certain money versus uncertain 
leisure, certain leisure versus uncertain money).   
 Certain money versus uncertain money (MM).  Prior to beginning each condition, 
participants were presented with a written orientation describing the options to be presented.  For 
the MM condition, the orientation instructions read as follows: 
In the following questions, you will choose between a certain amount of money and a 
larger, uncertain amount of money.  If you choose the certain amount of money, you will 
receive it immediately.  If you choose the uncertain amount of money, you will have a 
chance to receive that amount of money, but there is also a chance that you will receive 
nothing. 
 
The certain reward format was “$[value] for certain.”  The uncertain reward was presented on 
the right button and read, “A [probability]% chance of obtaining $[value].” 
Certain leisure versus uncertain leisure (LL).  In the LL condition, the orientation 
instructions were: 
In the following questions, you will choose between being able to have access to your 
mobile device for a limited amount of time for certain, or a chance to have normal access 
to your mobile device.  If you choose the certain, limited access, you will be able to use 
your mobile device for the specified amount of time.   After the time expires, your mobile 
device will turn off for the rest of the day.  If you choose the uncertain amount of access 
to your mobile device, you have the chance to have access to your mobile device for that 
amount of time, but there is also the chance that you will have no access for 24 hours. 
 
The format of the certain option was “The certain opportunity to use your mobile device for 
[hours/minutes] in a given day” and the uncertain reward was presented as “A [probability]% 
chance to use your mobile device for [hours/minutes] in a given day.” 
Certain money versus uncertain leisure (ML). In this condition, the orientation 
instructions were: 
In the following questions, you will choose between receiving some amount of money for 
certain or some amount of access to your mobile device that is uncertain.  If you choose 
to receive the certain amount of money, you will receive it immediately, but you will also 




your mobile device.  If you choose the uncertain amount of access to your mobile device, 
you have the chance to have access to your mobile device for that amount of time, but 
there is also the chance that you will have no access for 24 hours. 
 
Participants chose between certain money (“$[value] for certain.”) and uncertain access to leisure 
activity (“A [probability]% chance to use your mobile device for [hours/minutes] in a given 
day.”). 
Certain leisure versus uncertain money (LM).  The orientation instructions read: 
In the following questions, you will choose between receiving access to your mobile 
device for certain for a limited amount of time, or some amount of money that is 
uncertain.  If you choose the certain, limited access, you will be able to use your mobile 
device for the specified amount of time.  After the time expires, your mobile device will 
turn off for the rest of the day.  If you choose the uncertain amount of money, you will 
have a chance to receive that amount of money, but there is also a chance that you will 
receive nothing.  Whether you receive the money or not, you will not have access to your 
mobile device for 24 hours.  You cannot have both the money and your mobile device. 
 
Participants chose between certain access to leisure activities (“The certain opportunity to use 
your mobile device for [hours/minutes] in a given day”) and uncertain monetary rewards (“A 
[probability]% chance of obtaining $[value]”). 
Data Analysis   
Because the MM condition represents a previously validated discounting paradigm, 
participants who did not discount monotonically during this condition, meeting the two criteria 
established by Johnson and Bickel (2008), were excluded from analysis.  The two criteria were 
(1) the indifference point under the lowest probability was less than the indifference point for the 
highest probability by at least 10% of the undiscounted value, and (2) no indifference points 
exceeded an adjacent, higher probability indifference point by more than 20% of the 
undiscounted value.  The rationale for this exclusionary criterion was that if participants did not 
discount in a validated discounting condition, it was unlikely that they would discount in other 




For participants who demonstrated orderly discounting in the MM condition, four 
alternate models of discounting were compared to determine the model that provided the best 
and most parsimonious fit of the empirical data (Equations 1, 3, 4, and 7) in addition to a random 
noise control model (a horizontal line).  Model fits were compared using a selection algorithm 
based on Akaike’s Information Criterion, corrected for small sample size (AICc) values, which is 
a method for comparing models that takes into account the number of parameters in a given 
model and penalizes it to avoid overfitting (Burnham & Anderson, 2004).  The algorithm is 
similar to that proposed by Franck et al. (2014), substituting AICc for BIC.  Model selection was 
made on the basis of Akaike weights derived from AICc values using the formulas (Appendix  
D) described by Burnham and Anderson (2004).  Participant data were excluded from further 
analyses if the control model was selected as the most probable model in the MM condition.  
One additional participant was excluded for a total of three. 
Discounting metrics were obtained for all participants and conditions using three 
methods.  First, values of h were obtained using least squares non-linear regression.  
Additionally, two additional measures of discounting were also calculated: area under the 
discounting curve (AUC, trapezoidal method [Equation 5]) and Effective Probability 50% 
(EP50) calculated as the probability value at which the subjective value of the probabilistic 
outcomes is 50% of the undiscounted value.  Results of these analyses were then compared 
across conditions.  An ANOVA was conducted to determine whether significant differences 
existed between data across conditions.  Because each participant completed each of the four 
conditions, a matched-set nonparametric ANOVA (Friedman’s) was used.  In addition, 
nonparametric correlations (Spearman’s rho) were obtained for discounting values to determine 




Results and Discussion 
 AICc values are provided in Table 1-4.  For the MM condition, the hyperbolic model was 
selected for the most data sets than other models individually.  The exponential model was only 
selected for four data sets and the control model (random noise) was selected for one data set.  
For the LL condition, similar results were obtained with the exception of the random noise model 
being selected for six data sets suggesting six participants did not discount systematically as a 
function of probability during the LL condition. 
 In the cross commodity conditions, model selections in the LM condition resembled 
those from the single-commodity conditions with modal selections of the hyperbolic model.  For 
the ML condition, the modal model was Equation 4 (a hyperboloid model).  The random noise 
model was selected for nine data sets across both conditions. 
 In sum, models of discounting appear to adequately describe the empirical data from each 
of the four conditions suggesting probability affects preference similarly to past studies in 
discounting with the hyperbolic model being selected for the most data sets overall.  However, 
because the hyperbolic model did not provide the most probable fit for a clear majority of data 
sets, subsequent analyses were conducted using parameters obtained from the hyperbolic model 
as well as the model selected for each participant based on the AICc model selection algorithm. 
 Figure 1 depicts hyperbolic model fits of aggregate group data for each condition with the 
hyperbolic model fit to group medians.  Comparison of the fitted curves to expected values in 
each figure indicates participants more steeply discounted uncertain access to leisure activities 
than uncertain money. That is, participants were more risk-averse when access to leisure 
activities was the uncertain outcome.  This finding is similar to the findings of Bickel et al. 




money.  An estimate of skewness for value of h indicated the values were not normally 
distributed, so values were log transformed and mean ln(h) values are depicted in Figure 2.  A 
comparison of these discounting parameters supports the above conclusion that the largest 
differences were between conditions in which money was the uncertain outcome and conditions 
in which leisure was the uncertain outcome.  A Friedman’s matched-pairs ANOVA showed 
significant differences between conditions for values of ln(h) (χ2 (3) = 29.84, p < .0001).  A post-
hoc multiple comparison test showed three of six comparisons to be statistically significant at the 
.05 level or better. 
 To determine whether using the most probable model for each data set would yield 
different conclusions, discounting parameters were obtained using the model selected by the 
AICc algorithm.  From these parameters, EP50 was derived using the formulas provided by 
Franck et al. (2014).  For ease of comparison, EP50 was also derived for each participant using 
the value of h obtained from the hyperbolic model.  The mean EP50 for both hyperbolic fits and 
individualized fits is depicted in Figure 3.  EP50 derived from both models illustrates the same 
patterns of differences between conditions compared to the analysis of ln(h) values.  That is the 
largest differences between conditions visually are between conditions where the uncertain 
outcome was money and those in which the uncertain outcome was leisure.  Another Friedman’s 
test revealed significant differences between conditions (χ2 (3) = 31.82, p < .0001) and the post-
hoc test reached significance for three comparisons (p < .05) using the hyperbolic EP50.  Using 
EP50 derived from individualized fits also showed condition differences (χ2 (3) = 22.77, p < 
.0001) with two post-hoc tests reaching significance. 
 Finally, AUC was calculated for each participant as a model-independent metric of 




differences in discounting across conditions were preserved in this analysis, but failed to reach 
significance (χ2 (3) = 5.912, p = .1160). 
 At the group level, the method of discounting analysis did not appear to alter conclusions 
drawn with the exception that some statistically significant differences were not confirmed 
across all methods.  The hyperbolic model provided an adequate fit of group data for three of 
four conditions (MM, LL, and LM).  However, the model selection algorithm revealed the 
hyperbolic model did not provide the most probable model of discounting data for all 
individuals.  Comparing model selections across conditions revealed the same model was 
selected across all four conditions for only seven out of 23 participants.  For four participants, the 
common model was the hyperbolic model.  For two participants, Equation 4 was the common 
model while Equation 3 was common to all four conditions for one participant. 
The failure of one model to best describe data across conditions within subjects suggests 
either that participants discounted differently as a function of the commodities being compared, 
or some other feature of the procedure artificially changed the shape of discounting curves across 
conditions.  Table 5 displays correlation coefficients between conditions.  All conditions except 
LM and ML were significantly and positively correlated.  This supports the findings of previous 
cross-commodity discounting studies (e.g., Bickel et al., 2011). 
Because participants affected the nominal values of both commodities presented, 
discounting may have varied as a function of amount (i.e., a magnitude effect or rate-
dependency).  A correlation analysis of discounting rates and the nominal amount of each 
commodity supplied by participants in the pre-assessment questionnaire revealed some 
significant correlations between amount and h values.  Plots and coefficients are depicted in 




In sum, these results suggest access to leisure activities does not retain its value well 
when access is uncertain, especially when a monetary reward is provided as a certain alternative.  
Leisure was discounted most steeply in the ML condition.  Conversely, money retained more of 
its value when uncertain when the alternative was access to leisure.  These findings should be 
well received in organizational settings in which monetary bonuses are available to suppress off-
task behaviors in the workplace.  However, in the LM condition, which would best represent 
such a bonus contingency, participants did discount the value of uncertain money.  At a 25% 
chance of obtaining a monetary reward, the average subjective value had dropped to nearly 20% 
of the nominal value.  The present study presented the monetary option as an uncertain but 
response-independent outcome.  Thus, it may be the case that the reduced value paired with a 
response effort commensurate with workplace performance standards could further jeopardize 
the efficacy of such an incentive.  Implications for workplace settings would be better formed 
following an investigation more closely modeling contingencies in a work setting. 
The implications and findings of the present study should be tempered, though, as several 
limitations exist.  First, the individual indifference points plotted in Figure 1 illustrate the range 
of discounting rates across participants.  The degree to which participants discounted 
probabilistic commodities was idiosyncratic.  Second, the population sampled may not be 
representative of employees as undergraduate students were a population of convenience.  It 
could be the case that the participants in the present study represent a skewed or biased sample.  
Replication of these findings with a larger sample and different populations would strengthen 
conclusions that the patterns observed describe discounting in a larger population.  Third, the 
amounts of both the certain and uncertain options presented to participants was dependent on 




response to the question did not reflect an actual point of equivalency) the range of amounts 
presented may have been limited, affecting obtained indifference points.  This procedure has 
been used in past literature but may still be a limitation.  Fourth, analysis of group data may have 
been affected by the differing amounts of both commodities presented to participants as a result 
of basing the options on responses to the pre-assessment questions.  Amount has been shown to 
influence discount rate, so comparison of discounting parameters across amounts may have 
influenced the findings.  Rate dependency based on differences in the strength of consumption 
behavior for leisure activities may also have had an effect as indicated by the correlation analysis 
(Figure 5).  Particularly for MM and ML, the correlations resemble the magnitude effect for 
probability discounting where higher amounts were discounted more steeply (higher h values) 
than smaller amounts.  This effect of amount may explain some of the variability between 
participants.  Further investigation of the effects of amount on discounting would be beneficial.  
Finally, implications for work settings should also be tempered due to the lack of representation 
of workplace environmental characteristics.  For example, earning a bonus is unlikely to be the 
only contingency controlling decisions between on-task and off-task response allocation.  
Avoidance of punitive measures or other sources of motivation to complete work tasks may alter 
the nature of discounting.  The generality of these findings to less hypothetical and 
straightforward arrangements may be limited. 
Experiment 2: Hypothetical Workplace Discounting Task 
 The purpose of Experiment 2 was to address some limitations to external validity present 
in Experiment 1.  A similar procedure was used in conjunction with the presentation of a 
workplace scenario to determine whether features of a workplace might alter the degree to which 





 Participants and setting.  Forty-one undergraduate participants from introductory 
behavior analysis courses were recruited to participate in the study.  The materials were identical 
to those used in Experiment 1.  The same computer testing lab and computer program were used.  
The program was modified slightly to present two different conditions described below. 
 Dependent measure.  Indifference points were calculated for each participant and 
condition using the same method as Experiment 1. 
Procedures.  Participants were given an information statement to read in hard copy prior 
to beginning the computer task.  They indicated consent to participate by clicking a button on the 
screen.  The program then presented a scenario and modified versions of the three pre-
assessment questions from Experiment 1.  At the top of the screen, the program presented a 
scenario reading: “Imagine that you are an employee completing a repetitive task for $8.00 per 
hour (e.g., food service, cashier, call center/telemarketing, etc.).  To begin, please respond to the 
following questions as an employee under the conditions described above.”  Instead of asking 
about mobile device use during a typical 24-hr day as in Experiment 1, participants indicated an 
activity involving a mobile device they choose most frequently when taking a break from work 
tasks, the proportion of an 8-hr work day they spend using the mobile device, and the amount of 
money that would be equivalent to using their mobile device for that period of time during a 
work day.  After completing the three pre-assessment questions, the program presented three 
conditions of the discounting task.  The general procedures were identical to those in Experiment 
1.  Participants made selections between a smaller, certain option and a larger, probabilistic 
option presented at 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%, and 95% probabilities in either an 




reward was taken from the participants’ responses to the pre-assessment questions and the initial 
value of the certain reward was 50% of the undiscounted value.  The same titrating-amount 
procedure was used, either increasing or decreasing the certain reward value by 50% of the 
previous adjustment amount following each of six trials at each probability level.  In addition to 
the methods described for Experiment 1, participants were required to respond correctly to two 
true/false questions before beginning each of the three conditions.  The questions were posed as 
an attending response to ensure participants understood the options to follow. 
 Certain money versus uncertain money (MM).  This condition was identical to the MM 
condition in Experiment 1.  Participants chose between a smaller, certain amount of money and a 
larger, probabilistic amount of money at each of the seven probability values listed above.  The 
orientation instructions accompanying trials in the MM condition were identical to those given in 
Experiment 1.  The phrasing of the certain option was, “$[value] for certain” and the uncertain 
options read, “A [probability]% chance of obtaining $[value].” 
 Certain money versus access to leisure with an uncertain outcome (ML).  The purpose 
of this condition was to evaluate how participants value money in comparison to the opportunity 
to engage in leisure activities in the context of workplace consequences.  Participants chose 
between receiving some amount of money for certain—with the caveat that they would have to 
surrender their mobile devices for the duration of the 8-hr work day—and the opportunity to use 
their mobile devices and risk being caught being unproductive by a supervisor.  To avoid 
framing this condition as a loss, the latter option was presented as the probability of using mobile 
devices normally during a workday without any negative consequences.  The orientation 




The certain options was phrased as, “$[value] for certain, in exchange for refraining from using 
your mobile device for the entire work day” and the uncertain option read, “A [probability]% 
chance to use your mobile device normally during the day without any negative workplace 
consequences.” 
 Certain leisure versus uncertain incentive (LM).  The purpose of this condition was 
similar to that of the previous condition, but used a different frame.  In this condition, 
participants chose between opting out of the incentive program in exchange for limited access to 
their mobile devices for certain and the probabilistic chance to earn an incentive by refraining 
from using their mobile devices for the entire work day.  To orient participants to the options, 
orientation instructions were as follows: 
The certain option was “The certain opportunity to use your mobile device for [value] h/min in a 
given work day, but you are not eligible for the $[value] bonus.  The uncertain option was 
presented as, “A [probability]% chance of obtaining $[value] in exchange for refraining from 
using your mobile device for the entire work day.” 
Data Analysis 
 Because the two added conditions represent a departure from how past discounting 
measures have been formatted, four models of discounting were fitted to the data to evaluate 
whether discounting produces an accurate account of participant preferences.  Curves were fitted 
to the data including the traditional exponential discounting equation, hyperbolic equation, and 
two variations of the hyperboloid equation proposed by Rachlin (2006) and Myerson and Green 
(1995).  In addition, a random noise comparison model was tested to identify instances of 
unsystematic preference as a function of probability.  Participant data were excluded using the 




condition according to the criteria proposed by Johnson and Bickel (2008), or the random noise 
model was selected as the most probable model for the data, those data were excluded from 
further analysis.  Four participants were excluded based on the former and one additional 
participant was excluded on the basis of model selection for a total of five.  Model fits were 
compared using the AICc value-based model selection algorithm described in Experiment 1.  
Finally, analyses were conducted to determine whether probability discounting of monetary 
rewards predicted participant preference in the workplace context conditions.  Values of h, EP50 
and AUC were calculated and tested using a Friedman’s ANOVA and Spearman correlations. 
Results and Discussion 
 Results from the model fits are displayed in Tables 6-8.  The model selection algorithm 
produced results similar to those in Experiment 1 for the MM condition.  The hyperbolic model 
was the modal, most probable model followed by the two hyperboloid models.  The exponential 
model was not most probable for any data sets.  For the ML condition, the hyperbolic model was 
again the mode, followed by the two hyperboloid models.  However, the exponential model was 
most probable for four participants and five participants did not discount systematically as a 
function of probability (random noise model).  The hyperbolic equation was also selected most 
frequently for the LM condition.  The control model and exponential models were selected for 
three participants each. 
 Indifference points and the hyperbolic model fitted to the group median are displayed in 
Figure 6.  Inspection of the curves suggests uncertain money retained its value when the certain 
alternative was access to leisure.  That is, participants were relatively risk-seeking in the LM 
condition as indicated by the shallow curve.  As in Experiment 1, discounting parameters were 




selection algorithm.  Values of ln(h) from hyperbolic fits are displayed in Figure 7.  The 
direction of effects was similar to Experiment 1 with discounting occurring more steeply in ML 
compared to MM and discounting occurring less steeply in LM compared to MM.  A comparison 
between ln(h) values across conditions was made using Friedman’s matched-pairs ANOVA and 
supported significant differences (χ2 (3) = 17.56, p = .0002).  Pair-wise post hoc comparisons 
supported significant differences between ML and LM (p < .001) as well as between MM and 
LM (p < .01). 
 EP50 was also calculated using both the h values derived from the hyperbolic model as 
well as the parameters derived from the preferred model as determined by the AICc selection 
algorithm; both are depicted in Figure 8.  EP50 values for the hyperbolic model showed 
significant differences (χ2 (3) = 17.56, p = .0002) between LM and both other conditions (LM vs. 
ML:  p < .001; LM vs. MM: p < .01).  EP50 derived from individualized model fits showed a 
significant difference (χ2 (3) = 9.929, p = .007) only between ML and LM (p < .01) after 13 
participants were excluded from the analysis due to missing values.  The same analysis based on 
AUC (Figure 9) values yielded the same direction of differences (χ2 (3) = 8.667, p = .0131) and a 
significant difference between ML and LM (p < .01) was obtained.  Unlike Experiment 1, no 
significant correlation was obtained between nominal amounts for either commodity and rates of 
discounting. 
 Similarly to Experiment 1, the discounting model or analysis method used did not change 
the overall conclusions at the group level.  The directions of differences in discounting rates 
mirrors those in Experiment 1, suggesting the addition of a hypothetical workplace scenario did 




When leisure is made available as a certain alternative, the monetary rewards retained more 
value than when the certain alternative was a smaller monetary amount. 
 The LM condition is the most relevant to organizational incentive arrangements.  That is, 
employees working under an incentive system where reinforcement is contingent upon 
performance may choose between allocating behavior to off-task behaviors that produce certain 
consequences and allocating behavior to on-task behaviors that produce uncertain consequences 
through the bonus program.  The median indifference points and EP50 showed that under these 
conditions, the monetary bonus retained nearly 50% of its value when the probability was 25% 
compared to MM and ML where the uncertain commodity lost 50% of its value at 49% and 59%, 
respectively. 
 The present experiment is subject to the same limitations as Experiment 1 because the 
experimental preparation is the same.  The literature shows hypothetical discounting tasks to be 
reasonably valid in comparison to more experiential tasks (e.g., Madden & Johnson, 2010).  
However, participants coming to the experiment with different extra-experimental histories of 
workplace consequences may interpret the workplace scenario differently.  The self-reported 
usage of mobile devices and equivalent monetary amount also differed widely between 
participants.  Unlike Experiment 1, no clear or consistent relation between nominal amounts and 
discounting was obtained. 
The experimental preparation used in the present study also differs in some potentially 
important ways from an actual workplace.  The commodities presented were hypothetical and 
although the literature has supported the validity of hypothetical discounting tasks, contacting the 
contingencies described may affect preference and subsequent choice.  In addition, participants 




upon completing one or more effortful responses.  Although the hypothetical scenario asked 
participants to imagine they were performing a repetitive task, it would be informative to 
determine whether having participants experience a real repetitive task would affect choice. 
The purpose of Experiment 3 is to examine the effects of probabilistic bonus 
contingencies on the performance of a repetitive analogue work task and to extend the findings 
of the previous experiments to an analogue work environment using experiential rather than 
hypothetical contingencies. 
Experiment 3: Experiential Operant Discounting Task in an Analogue Workplace Setting 
Method 
Participants and setting.  The participants in the present study were six undergraduate 
students recruited via in-class announcements and flyers posted at a large Midwestern university.  
No exclusionary criteria were applied for initial admittance into the participant pool.  In 
exchange for participation, participants were paid a base rate of $2.50 per 1-hr session.  
Throughout each session, participants also had the opportunity to earn monetary incentives or 
avoid disincentives.  Sessions took place once per day, two to three days per week, with each 
session lasting approximately 1 hr.  Within the 1-hr sessions, participants were given the 
opportunity to complete a simulated work task in blocks of 5 min with a brief rest period 
between blocks.   
All sessions were conducted in a small research room measuring 2.21 m by 2.03 m by 
2.44 m, designed to mimic a common office space/cubical.  The room was adjoined to an 
observation booth of the same dimensions by a panel of mirrored glass.  The research room was 
equipped with a Dell® computer connected to a 50.8 cm diagonal monitor, standard keyboard, 




0.74 m) with an office chair.  The research room also contained several leisure materials 
including magazines and a current school newspaper.  In addition to the computer’s use for 
completing the experimental task, participants had access to the other features of the computer, 
including internet access.  Finally, participants were permitted to bring any materials, such as 
homework, a cell phone, or a tablet computer into the room during sessions. 
Apparatus and materials.  The experimental task was presented in its entirety by a 
computer program written in Microsoft® Visual Basic.Net.  The task was a check-processing 
task in which participants were asked to type the dollar amount of each generated check image 
into an entry box.  The program was designed as a standalone desktop application.  The interface 
window (Appendix E) was 30 cm by 13 cm and occupied a portion of the computer screen such 
that participants could access the other features of the computer.  The program displayed a 
generated check image consisting of randomly generated routing numbers, account numbers, 
dates, check numbers, amounts, and payee names.  The names were generated by randomly 
drawing a first name and last name from a list of 150 each.  A text-entry box was displayed 4.5 
cm to the right of the check image below the instructions, “Enter the amount displayed on the 
check in the box below.  Press ENTER or click the Submit button to submit the amount and 
move to the next check.”  Once the amount was typed, clicking a button labeled “Submit” or 
pressing the ENTER key on the keyboard submitted the amount and displayed the next check.  
The program could be minimized to the computer’s task bar or closed.  When closed, the 
program displayed a button in the bottom-left corner of the monitor reading “Return to Task.”  





Additional materials for the present study included the Behavioral Inhibition 
System/Behavioral Activation System Scales (BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 1994).  The BIS/BAS 
is a validated scale that assesses sensitivity to punishment (BIS) and reward (BAS).  The BIS 
scale is a single factor scale and the BAS scale loads onto three factors, resulting in three BAS 
subscales: reward responsiveness, drive, and fun seeking.  Alpha reliability for the BIS is .74 and 
reliability for reward responsiveness, drive, and fun seeking are .73, .76, and .66, respectively.  
The scale is presented in Appendix F. 
Dependent variables and response measurement.  Two primary dependent variables 
were collected: number of checks processed correctly and time on-task.  A correctly processed 
check was recorded when the value the participant typed and submitted was identical to the 
numerical amount displayed on the check.  To keep the time required to process each check 
constant, all amounts had five digits (i.e., all amounts were between $100.00 and $999.99).  
Time on task was defined as the number of seconds during which a participant was processing 
checks.  Specifically, a timer for on-task behavior ran until 5 s had passed since the participant 
submitted the last check value.  A timer for off-task behavior then ran until the participants 
submitted the next check amount.  The computer program collected data for both measures 
automatically.  Additionally, the computer collected data on whether participants met the 
performance criterion for earning incentives, or avoiding disincentives.  The performance 
criterion is described in more detail below.  Participants also completed the hypothetical 
discounting task described in Experiment 2, from which hyperbolic model fits were used to 
obtain h values. 
Experimental design and procedures.  The experimental design was a multielement 




participants.  The multielement design was used to compare performance across varying levels of 
probability.  The reversal design was used to compare performance between probabilistic 
incentives (A) and disincentives (B).  To reduce the number of blocks run for each participant, 
reversal probes were conducted in lieu of a full reversal for a subset of five probabilities (5%, 
10%, 25%, 50%, and 95%).  If differentiation obtained in previous conditions was not replicated, 
additional blocks were implemented until stability was obtained. 
Upon arriving, participants were greeted and shown into the research room.  After 
obtaining written consent, the experimenter described the task.  The orientation script is provided 
in Appendix G. 
 Incentive condition.  The purpose of the incentive condition was to evaluate the effects 
of probabilistic incentive arrangements on the rate of correct check processing and time-on-task.  
During all blocks of this condition, participants were informed they may choose to complete as 
many or as few checks as they would like.  Participants were also free to engage in other 
activities available in the session room, either using provided materials or materials they brought 
with them.  If they worked on the check-processing task, they had a chance to earn a $0.75 
monetary bonus, which was determined both by a programmed probability and a minimum 
performance criterion. 
The probability programmed for each 5-min block determined whether the minimum 
performance criterion would be applied and the bonus delivered.  The determination for whether 
the 5-min block was evaluated was made using a 20-sided die.  Prior to beginning the block, the 
experimenter informed the participant of the probability that his or her performance would be 
evaluated for the incentive as well as the results of the die toss that would result in an evaluation.  




number 1.  If the probability was 10%, the block was evaluated if the die landed on either 1 or 2.  
If a block was flagged for evaluation and the average rate of correctly processed checks was 
equal to or greater than 16.0/min, the bonus was delivered.  Because one participant (06) 
expressed difficulty with using the keyboard number pad, the criterion was set at 14 correctly 
processed checks per minute for all sessions for this participant only.  In each 5-min block, the 
probability that performance would be evaluated for the bonus was either 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 
75%, 90%, or 95% presented in a pseudorandom sequence such that all seven probabilities were 
presented before repeating.  
Disincentive condition.  In addition to evaluating varying incentive arrangements, the 
present study also determined whether the probability of gaining an incentive differed from the 
opportunity to avoid loss of an incentive.  Each probability described above was replicated using 
identical procedures with the exception that participants were informed they would receive a 
performance incentive, but there was a chance their performance would be evaluated and if their 
performance was observed to fall below the minimum criterion of 16.0 (or 14)/min, they would 
lose the bonus. 
Choice phase and debriefing.  After completing the procedures, participants were 
provided the opportunity to choose the conditions for one final block.  Choice was given between 
the incentive and disincentive arrangements as well as the probability of evaluation.  The 
purpose of the choice block was to determine subjective preference for conditions and a measure 
of the social validity of incentive arrangements.  After completing the choice block, participants 
were asked to complete the BIS/BAS.  The purpose of this scale in the present study was to 
determine whether it corresponded to differences in performance across incentive and 




hypothetical discounting task described in Experiment 2 such that patterns of responding in the 
present experiment could be compared to a measure of discounting. 
Data Analysis 
 Differences in check processing rates between incentive and disincentive conditions were 
determined within subjects using visual inspection of the reversal design graphs.  Differences in 
check processing and time-on-task between levels of probability were determined via visual 
inspection of the multielement data series.  In addition, the processing rate for the last data point 
in each probability for each participant was plotted with probability to evaluate whether the 
dependent measures vary hyperbolically as a function of probability in a manner similar to 
discounting.  Quantitative comparison across conditions was made by calculating the area under 
the curve (AUC) of the graphs and comparing AUC across conditions using a Wilcoxon signed-
rank test.  Although the discounting literature has not provided precedence for using measures of 
effort as an index of subjective value, such a curvilinear relation may be useful in workplace 
settings to determine optimal arrangements for incentive systems in which some probability is 
inherent.  Discounting measures were also obtained using the hyperbolic model of probability 
discounting fitted to indifference points derived from the hypothetical discounting task 
administered at the end of the experiment for each participant.  The predictive validity of the 
hypothetical discounting measures were estimated by visually assessing whether a 
correspondence existed with responding during the analogue task. 
 To estimate relative costs and benefits associated with the use of the varying bonus 
arrangements, aggregate data were plotted.  Benefits were estimated by plotting a scatterplot of 
check processing rates for all participants by condition and probability.  Costs were also 




The proportion was calculated as the number of bonuses paid (resulting from both the die roll 
and the check processing rate) divided by the total number of blocks presented for each 
probability in each condition. 
 Because probability was determined using a 20-sided die, the potential for deviation from 
programmed probability existed.  The obtained probabilities for each participant are provided in 
Table 9.  Functionally, 5% probability was experienced as 0% for all participants and 95% 
probability was functionally 100%.  The remaining obtained probabilities were compared to 
programmed using Wilcoxon signed rank tests and no significant differences were obtained. 
 Finally, the fidelity with which the experimenter implemented the conditions was 
evaluated.  The implementation procedure was determined to have five steps for each block 
including (1) stating the probability as a percentage, (2) stating the corresponding number range 
on the 20-sided die, (3) stating the bonus contingency in effect, (4) re-stating the number range at 
the end of the session before rolling the die, and (5) stating whether the participant earned the 
bonus.  Fidelity was calculated for 30% of blocks for each condition and each participant by 
dividing the total number of steps implemented correctly by the total number of steps and 
converting to a percentage.  Fidelity was high across participants with the minimum being 90%.  
Fidelity data for all participants are provided in Table 10. 
Results and Discussion 
 Figure 10 depicts the multielement/reversal graphs for participants 01, 02, and 04.  The 
graphs depict a subset of the probabilities (excluding 75% and 90%) to reduce the number of 
data paths.  For participant 01, a clear differentiation in check processing rate was obtained 
between 5% and all other probabilities.  During sessions in both incentive and disincentive 




Similar allocation towards off-task behavior was initially obtained for 10% probability blocks in 
the incentive condition, but this was not replicated in the reversal design.  When given a choice 
of condition, participant 01 selected the disincentive condition with a 95% probability of 
performance evaluation with processing rate remaining high. 
Participant 02 exclusively allocated her behavior to the work task in the initial 
disincentive condition.  When the incentive condition was implemented, rates of check 
processing decreased to zero during both 5% and 10% probabilities.  This apparent difference 
between incentive and disincentive was not replicated, though, as check processing rates during 
5% blocks decreased to zero during the second disincentive condition and rates during both 5% 
and 10% probability blocks were low during the third disincentive condition.  In addition, 
participant 02 engaged in off-task behaviors during 25% probability blocks during incentive and 
disincentive conditions occurring in one day of the experiment.  Attempts to replicate the 
resulting low rates of check processing during the next session resulted in a return to the 
previous, high rate of processing.  On the day the participant was off-task during 25% probability 
blocks, she noted she was reading an e-book on her cell phone. When given a choice, she 
selected the disincentive condition with a 5% probability.  As in previous 5% probabilities, she 
did not process checks during the choice block. 
Participant 04 showed a similar pattern of responding as participant 02.  All responding 
was allocated to the work task during the initial disincentive condition.  During the incentive 
condition, processing rates during 5% and 10% declined to zero, which was replicated in a 
subsequent reversal probe.  During the second disincentive condition, processing rate remained 
low for 5% probability blocks while rates during 10% blocks nearly returned to the original 




previous phases, she allocated her behavior to the work task during the choice block but the rate 
fell slightly below the criterion. 
Data for participants 03, 05, and 06 are depicted in Figure 11.  None of these participants 
demonstrated differentiated patterns of responding across either incentive and disincentive 
conditions or levels of probability.  Some variability in the absolute rate of check processing was 
obtained for participant 03 across probabilities, but these differences were not consistent.  Rate 
data for both participants 05 and 06 were level and stable across most blocks.  Participant 03 
selected the 95% disincentive condition during the choice block.  Participants 05 and 06 both 
selected the disincentive condition, and chose 5% and 50% probabilities, respectively. 
To facilitate ease of comparison between participants, Figure 12 depicts the rate of check 
processing obtained from the last block of each probability for both incentive and disincentive 
conditions.  This figure also permits comparison between incentive and disincentive conditions 
within participants.  Visual inspection yields no clear differences in processing rates between 
conditions, with the exception of participant 04 due to a difference during 10% probability 
blocks.  Area under each curve was calculated as a means for statistical comparison between 
conditions.  Areas under the curve for incentive and disincentive conditions were not statistically 
significantly different according to a Wilcoxon signed rank test (p > .9999). 
 As described previously, one goal of the present study was to determine whether existing 
measures have predictive validity for how individuals will respond to probabilistic incentive 
arrangements.  One such face valid measure is the h value in probability discounting.  Figure 13 
depicts discounting curves derived from indifference points from the hypothetical discounting 
task administered at the end of the experiment. Data for participants for whom probability 




with participants for whom data were undifferentiated on the right.  Visual comparison does not 
yield any clear and consistent differences.  Generally, the hyperbolic model fits well described 
the indifference points.  However, for participants 05 and 06, the hyperbolic model substantially 
underestimated subjective value at lower probabilities for the LM condition and the MM 
condition also for 05.  This pattern was different than other participants and might indicate a 
relative insensitivity to probability beyond a certain threshold.  Such an insensitivity to 
differences in probability at the lower end of the continuum would seem to have some face 
validity for predicting participant insensitivity to probability during the work task (i.e., allocating 
responding to the task despite low chances of contacting the bonus contingency).  However, 
participant 03 did not share this pattern of discounting.  Thus, discounting in the hypothetical 
task did not appear to have predictive value for performance in the work task.  Further research is 
needed to examine whether probability discounting is not predictive of the type of performance 
measured in the present study, or if some feature of the hypothetical discounting task influenced 
the degree to which the same phenomenon was captured. 
  Scores for the three BAS subscales and the BIS scale are provided in Table 11.  
Although a planned analysis included evaluating the predictive validity of the BIS/BAS scales 
for differences in performance across incentive and disincentive conditions, no consistent 
differences between processing rates were obtained in the present study making such an analysis 
impossible.  It is currently unclear whether the absence of differentiation is due to an artifact of 
the experimental preparation.  Five participants indicated a preference for the disincentive 
condition during the choice phase, which may suggest it was not an aversive condition as such a 
condition may be in an actual workplace.  Of note is that in the present study, the disincentive 




incentive condition.  That is, if participants completed the work task and met the performance 
criterion, they were certain to receive the bonus whereas in the incentive condition, meeting the 
criterion did not guarantee receipt of the bonus.  It may have been aversive, then, to have 
completed the work requirement and receive no bonus, which was only possible in the incentive 
condition. 
 A number of limitations are worth noting.  A few limitations are related to external 
validity.  The experimental preparation was designed to synthesize a workplace environment, but 
still differed from actual workplaces in a number of ways.  The work blocks were only 5 min in 
duration rather than several hours or longer.  In addition, the experimenter gave the participants 
the option to do any amount of work and explicitly stated the probabilistic contingencies each 
time, both of which are unlikely to occur in an organizational context.  However, the present 
study was designed to isolate the effects of probability on allocation of behavior and exhibiting 
experimental control required some compromises to external validity in early stages of this line 
of research.  Future research might extend the present findings to contexts and methods that bear 
better similarity to real world work settings.  Another limitation is the absence of a clear 
difference between the disincentive and incentive conditions.  The framing or design of the 
conditions may not have captured differences that would have exerted control over differentiated 
responding.  Further research might examine modified preparations in which a disincentive 
condition is functionally aversive.  Finally, the present study did not yield an assessment measure 
that is predictive of response allocation under varying probabilities.  Identifying such a measure 
through additional research could have implications for a number of organizational practices. 
 Within the boundaries of the limitations, the present study suggests uncertainty in 




for organizational settings.  Half of the participants maintained productive behavior throughout 
the experiment regardless of the probability of contacting the incentive or disincentive 
contingencies.  For the other half, a probability of 25% or higher appeared to be sufficient to 
maintain responding, suggesting employees do not need to be monitored continuously for an 
incentive program to be effective. 
 Neither of the two face-valid measures predicted performance during the analogue work 
task.  Identifying a measure with predictive validity may prove useful moving forward as 
probability did not affect all participants equally.  Such a measure may improve several aspects 
of organizational practices.  For example, during initial screening and hiring employees might be 
chosen from applicants who would likely perform well under the incentive system an 
organization already has in place based on responding to a hypothetical task.  Or, an organization 
interested in designing an incentive system might assess employee sensitivity to and preference 
for varying incentive arrangements to inform the design.  If assessment measures that accurately 
predict performance are unavailable, another direction to pursue is an abbreviated direct 
observation procedure similar to the present preparation, which could help generate a curve 
similar to those presented in Figure 14.  By aggregating data across employees, organizations 
may be able to make empirical decisions about how much productivity can be expected under 
varying conditions.  The other side of the cost-benefit ratio is depicted in Figure 15.  By plotting 
the actual amount paid as incentives under each arrangement, organizations could see whether a 
ceiling effect occurs such that higher probabilities cost more, but do not yield further benefit.  
Combining the Figures 14 and 15, employees are likely to prefer a disincentive arrangement with 
a lower probability of contacting the contingency as this would maximize bonus pay even when 




arrangement with a 25% probability as this would maximize employee output while keeping 
bonus pay low.  Other implications are discussed in the context of all three studies in more detail 
below. 
General Discussion 
 The purpose of the first experiment was to extend previous findings in probability and 
cross-commodity discounting research to a commodity that is relevant for organizational 
settings.  The results showed the discounting phenomenon applies to choices between money and 
access to leisure activities via mobile device use.  The second experiment examined whether 
discounting would be affected by framing the choice within a work context.  The slope of the 
discounting curves changed slightly, but discounting as a paradigm appeared to apply to this 
novel scenario.  In the third experiment, participants were placed in a simulated work context 
and given a choice between working for an uncertain bonus and allocating behavior to some 
other off-task behavior.  For three of six participants, lower probabilities of contacting the bonus 
contingency consistently resulted in allocation of behavior to off-task behaviors, including use of 
mobile devices during the session.  Collectively, these findings suggest probability and 
discounting can play a role in performance incentive efficacy as they are implemented in 
organizations. 
 These studies make a number of contributions to the literature.  First, the first two 
experiments extended findings in the extant discounting and cross commodity literature.  Second, 
the findings pose questions about how best to conceptualize the phenomena observed in 
Experiment 3.  That is, the goal of Experiment 3 was to apply discounting to choices available in 
a work setting.  However, other economic or behavior analytic concepts could potentially 




organizational behavior management and behavioral economics has also been shown.  The latter 
field has a robust literature in human choice and decision-making, which are directly relevant for 
organizations.  The present study contributes to the organizational behavior management 
literature by adding to the growing body of research suggesting the utility of quantitative and 
economic analyses of employee behavior.  Economic analyses have the potential to greatly 
increase understanding of and methods for correcting socially important issues.  Each of these is 
discussed in more detail below. 
 The findings of Experiment 1 closely resembled those reported by Bickel et al. (2011) 
and Jarmolowicz et al. (2014) from which the experimental preparation was derived.  These 
findings extended findings to both a new commodity as well as to probability discounting.  As 
the temporal location of cocaine and sexual activity affected the degree to which participants in 
the extant literature discounted their value, participants in the present study discounted the non-
monetary outcome more steeply when it was uncertain.  In addition, only one other study could 
be located that examined probability discounting across commodities (i.e., Mitchell, 2004).  
Thus, the present study contributed to filling a gap in the discounting literature.  Cross-
commodity discounting is likely to be an important area for future behavioral economic research.  
The traditional single-commodity discounting paradigm has contributed to the understanding of 
how several factors affect subjective value, but real-world decisions are also likely to involve 
choices between two different commodities that differ along temporal or probabilistic 
dimensions (e.g., substance abuse, risky sexual behavior, saving for retirement, preventative 
medicine). 
 A conceptual interpretation of the formal similarity between the LM conditions in the 




experiments is the shift in allocation in Experiment 3 under lower probabilities could be 
explained by a reduction in the subjective value of the incentive (i.e., probability discounting).  
Under a 10% or 5% probability of contacting the bonus contingency, the bonus did not retain 
sufficient value to maintain responding on the work task, which is to say probability functionally 
reduced the magnitude of reinforcement.  The absence of such a shift in allocation for three 
participants would then have to be explained.  Potentially, other contingencies or reinforcement 
histories may have been operating for those participants.  Anecdotally, all three participants 
reported during the post-experiment debriefing that they continued working because there was 
always a chance to earn the bonus.  Participant 06 went on to explain that she “has [bad] luck,” 
which may be indicative of a certain history of experience with probabilistic outcomes.  
Participant 02 reported during the day she was off-task during 25% blocks that she had started 
reading an interesting e-book (she was engaged with her cell phone during those blocks).  The 
availability of a particular activity on her phone appeared to change the relative efficacy of the 
bonus and leisure activities as consequences such that a 25% chance to earn a bonus was no 
longer sufficient to maintain responding.  This value-altering effect was not present during 
subsequent sessions and the pattern of allocation returned to previously observed levels.  Again, 
these are subjective self-reports.  Further research is needed to increase confidence in this 
interpretation of the data. 
Alternative explanations may provide an equal or more useful account of the data in 
Experiment 3.  Relative reinforcer efficacy is in the domain of demand analyses in behavioral 
economics.  That is, demand describes consumption of a commodity as a function of its unit 
price.  Conceptually, probability may increase the unit price of an outcome.  If given multiple 




per 20 blocks on average if the probability is 5%.  Because the block during which the bonus will 
actually be available is unknown, a participant would essentially have to work consistently 
enough to meet the performance criterion for each of those blocks.  Within the present 
experimental preparation, the unit price would be processing at least 1,600 checks (16 
checks/min, 5 min/block for 20 blocks).  Compared to a probability of 50% in which the unit 
price is 160 checks (16 checks/block, 5 min/block for 2 blocks), the unit price for the bonus 
under 5% probability is high.  Hursh, Raslear, Bauman, and Black (1989) proposed such a 
conceptual interpretation with probability included in an equation for unit price.  Beyond 
response effort, probability may also make receipt of the bonus more temporally remote if 
multiple blocks must be completed prior to the bonus being delivered, potentially resulting in a 
temporal discounting effect.  Last, the concept of competing contingencies of reinforcement has 
been thoroughly studied in the matching law literature (e.g., Baum, 1974).  If the function of 
probability is to change the relative rate of reinforcement, the matching law may provide an 
accurate account of relative allocation.  These interpretations might serve to direct future 
research. 
 Whichever paradigm provides the best account and predictive validity for allocation of 
behavior under uncertain incentives, one common component is a quantitative model: hyperbolic 
discounting, demand curves, and the generalized matching equation.  Quantitative analyses are 
likely to have utility for managers tasked with evaluating and designing mechanisms of 
organizational behavior change.  That is, the performance incentive literature has shown a robust 
effect of imposing a contingency between work and pay (see Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001).  
Organizations must also consider the efficiency of an intervention, especially in resource-poor 




goes beyond predicting a qualitative improvement in performance resulting from an intervention, 
providing a prediction for the degree of improvement.  The calculation of costs and benefits or 
return on investment require empirical estimates of both boosts in employee output expected 
from an intervention and the cost of the intervention associated with that improvement.  By 
comparing data such as those depicted in Figures 14 and 15, managers have an objective means 
to identify an incentive arrangement that would maximize employee performance while 
minimizing the associated cost.  In the context of Experiment 3, the ideal incentive system would 
resemble the incentive conditions with a 25% probability as all participants allocated responding 
exclusively or nearly exclusively to the work task, but incentives were paid less than 50% of the 
opportunities.  Higher probabilities were not associated with substantial increases in check 
processing rate so the cost to the organization would be higher without a commensurate increase 
in benefit.  However, depending on a number of factors, 25% may still be higher than what can 
be achieved by supervisors.  For a supervisor with a large number of employees, ensuring 
employees contact a bonus contingency at least 25% of the time may still be overwhelming.  In 
such cases, automatic or electromechanical means of measuring performance without direct 
intervention by a supervisor might be used when possible. 
 Because of the more translational/basic aspect of the study, implications should 
tempered; however, some limitations and findings in the present study do suggest more proximal 
directions for future research.  As an exploratory study adopting a translational approach to 
researching a novel application of behavioral economics to applied issues in organizational 
behavior management, some limitations were inherent to the approach as discussed previously.  
The degree to which these findings will generalize to applied contexts should be the focus of 




closely resembling the practical context of an organization.  Undergraduate students may not be 
representative of employees and may have less or different histories with probability, 
organizational contingencies, and other contextual variables present in the workplace.  The 
experimenter did not have control over a range of consequences for participants that would likely 
be present in an organization.  These could include a system of progressive discipline, social 
contingencies between peers, or other consequences.  A full work day or even more temporally 
extended intervals of incentive administration may also affect employees differently than 5-min 
blocks.  Precedence for longer session affecting the degree to which incentives affect behavior 
was shown by Oah and Lee (2011). 
 Second, changing the magnitude of the incentive may impact the probability level at 
which participants shifted allocation away from the work task.  That is, increasing the magnitude 
of the incentive might serve to maintain responding on the work task at even lower probabilities.  
Replications of Experiment 3 with varying incentive amounts could reveal whether amount has a 
consistent impact on allocation and performance.  This extension would provide further utility 
for organizations as increasing the amount of the bonus adds to costs, which could be justified if 
commensurate increases in performance also result. 
 Finally, the hypothetical task did not appear to capture the same phenomenon as the work 
task given the absence of a correspondence between performance and discounting.  It is unclear 
at present whether changes to the hypothetical task might better represent the type of choice 
scenario presented in Experiment 3.  The identification of an assessment method—either a 
discounting assessment or some other measure—to generate a quantitative model of performance 
would prove beneficial for organizations.  The prediction of employee performance is a subject 




IOP has suggested some methods for predicting employee performance such as situational 
judgment tests, structured interviews in which hypothetical scenarios are presented to assess 
what an employee would do in a given context (DiGennaro Reed, Hirst, & Howard, 2013).  The 
alternative is to directly measure actual behavior, such as in work sampling.  Such an approach 
could be used to measure how employees would respond to incentives by administering a 
modified procedure similar to the methods described here.  However, sampling work behavior 
directly could prove to be a costly undertaking for some organizations.  A hypothetical task, 
survey, or battery of some kind with a reasonably good predictive value for how employees 
would respond to incentive systems could provide a cost-effective means for designing or 
evaluating an incentive intervention.  Two metrics were proposed—discounting rate and 
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Table 1.  Akaike weights (ω) by participant for each model for the MM condition.  Highest 
likelihood values are bolded, indicating most probable model. 
 Akaike weight 












1 0.8119 0.0438 0.1110 0.0333 0.0000 
2 0.6332 0.0957 0.2626 0.0085 0.0000 
3 0.4140 0.1006 0.0210 0.4644 0.0000 
4 0.0079 0.7759 0.2157 0.0004 0.0002 
5 0.0013 0.7796 0.2189 0.0001 0.0000 
6 0.0607 0.2217 0.0209 0.6966 0.0000 
7 0.5442 0.1476 0.2002 0.0909 0.0171 
8 0.0335 0.5849 0.3786 0.0027 0.0002 
9 0.0054 0.3919 0.3067 0.0013 0.2947 
10 0.0029 0.3238 0.6719 0.0007 0.0007 
11 0.8511 0.0405 0.0943 0.0140 0.0000 
12 0.8267 0.0808 0.0352 0.0572 0.0000 
13 0.0002 0.0966 0.9031 0.0000 0.0000 
14 0.0163 0.4800 0.4091 0.0024 0.0922 
15 0.6246 0.1113 0.0250 0.2392 0.0000 
16 0.6060 0.1862 0.0746 0.1306 0.0027 
17 0.8890 0.0318 0.0538 0.0254 0.0000 
18 0.7145 0.0563 0.2088 0.0203 0.0000 
19 0.2599 0.4328 0.2858 0.0165 0.0049 
20 0.6759 0.0207 0.0284 0.2721 0.0029 
21 0.1935 0.6392 0.1330 0.0306 0.0037 
22 0.0051 0.1949 0.7983 0.0007 0.0011 
23 0.1469 0.4502 0.3454 0.0286 0.0288 
24 0.8983 0.0541 0.0280 0.0197 0.0000 
25 0.0003 0.3128 0.2831 0.0001 0.4037 
26 0.0285 0.6712 0.2971 0.0026 0.0006 
27 0.0443 0.1726 0.7774 0.0046 0.0012 
28 0.8429 0.0365 0.0953 0.0253 0.0000 
29 0.0069 0.1544 0.8369 0.0008 0.0009 
30 0.5678 0.2709 0.0500 0.1090 0.0023 
31 0.9359 0.0291 0.0294 0.0056 0.0000 
32 0.0858 0.5140 0.0117 0.3885 0.0000 
33 0.7187 0.0953 0.0921 0.0925 0.0014 
34 0.0398 0.3499 0.2879 0.0257 0.2967 
35 0.6163 0.0205 0.0198 0.3434 0.0001 
36 0.7878 0.0514 0.0843 0.0759 0.0007 
37 0.7096 0.0267 0.0214 0.2422 0.0001 
38 0.0258 0.8544 0.1174 0.0022 0.0002 




39 0.2068 0.5594 0.2058 0.0251 0.0029 
40 0.4539 0.2938 0.2133 0.0374 0.0015 
41 0.4035 0.0169 0.0211 0.5585 0.0001 
42 0.1755 0.0339 0.0232 0.7673 0.0001 
43 0.8156 0.0451 0.1245 0.0148 0.0000 
44 0.0000 0.7957 0.2042 0.0000 0.0000 
45 0.5753 0.0631 0.3578 0.0038 0.0000 
47 0.8338 0.0436 0.0996 0.0230 0.0000 
48 0.0006 0.1155 0.8837 0.0001 0.0002 
50 0.9415 0.0289 0.0284 0.0012 0.0000 
51 0.6318 0.2456 0.1189 0.0037 0.0000 
52 0.0013 0.3248 0.6739 0.0001 0.0000 
53 0.0201 0.5015 0.3790 0.0030 0.0963 
54 0.0814 0.2147 0.6953 0.0072 0.0013 
55 0.0001 0.3474 0.6524 0.0000 0.0001 
56 0.3491 0.4712 0.1240 0.0543 0.0014 
57 0.7724 0.0253 0.0238 0.1785 0.0001 






Table 2.  Akaike weights (ω) by participant for each model for the ML condition.  Highest 
likelihood values are bolded, indicating most probable model. 
 Akaike weight 












1 0.0030 0.1559 0.8409 0.0001 0.0000 
2 0.0005 0.5708 0.4166 0.0001 0.0121 
3 0.3157 0.3577 0.1785 0.0472 0.1010 
4 0.4646 0.1358 0.1260 0.0430 0.2307 
5 0.0001 0.8769 0.1229 0.0000 0.0002 
6 0.0066 0.0998 0.0968 0.0022 0.7946 
7 0.0828 0.3209 0.2549 0.0173 0.3241 
8 0.0023 0.8472 0.1472 0.0004 0.0029 
9 0.0517 0.3161 0.5534 0.0114 0.0674 
10 0.0166 0.9445 0.0363 0.0025 0.0001 
11 0.7566 0.0228 0.0233 0.1971 0.0002 
12 0.0194 0.4599 0.4957 0.0025 0.0224 
13 0.0013 0.6873 0.2952 0.0002 0.0160 
14 0.0005 0.6828 0.3022 0.0001 0.0143 
15 0.1773 0.1388 0.0200 0.6638 0.0000 
16 0.0655 0.6906 0.2417 0.0022 0.0001 
17 0.6941 - - 0.3057 - 
18 0.0006 0.3678 0.6311 0.0000 0.0005 
19 0.3075 0.1034 0.0954 0.0868 0.4069 
20 0.7605 0.0408 0.0860 0.1109 0.0018 
21 0.6285 0.1828 0.1774 0.0114 0.0000 
22 0.0033 0.3960 0.5213 0.0007 0.0788 
23 0.2071 0.0435 0.0588 0.1837 0.5069 
24 0.7738 0.0862 0.0610 0.0784 0.0007 
25 0.0000 0.3205 0.3525 0.0000 0.3270 
26 0.0000 0.1278 0.1330 0.0000 0.7391 
27 0.0123 0.7555 0.2298 0.0010 0.0014 
28 0.6103 0.0656 0.2971 0.0268 0.0001 
29 0.0453 0.7863 0.1603 0.0052 0.0029 
30 0.2168 0.0072 0.0267 0.7493 0.0000 
31 0.2173 0.4957 0.2748 0.0119 0.0003 
32 0.0013 0.4258 0.4112 0.0003 0.1614 
33 0.0004 0.0393 0.0389 0.0001 0.9213 
34 0.0167 0.0520 0.0517 0.0080 0.8717 
35 0.1085 0.6499 0.2274 0.0078 0.0063 
36 0.0005 0.6878 0.3106 0.0001 0.0010 
37 0.6641 0.0474 0.1922 0.0950 0.0014 
38 0.0190 0.8434 0.1367 0.0009 0.0000 




39 0.0015 0.8107 0.1845 0.0002 0.0031 
40 0.0289 0.6700 0.2835 0.0027 0.0149 
41 0.0052 0.5019 0.3889 0.0012 0.1029 
42 0.8756 0.0317 0.0274 0.0654 0.0000 
43 0.0396 0.4240 0.4013 0.0087 0.1264 
44 0.0036 0.6214 0.3657 0.0004 0.0089 
45 0.0069 0.6513 0.3218 0.0009 0.0190 
47 0.7168 0.0220 0.0371 0.2236 0.0004 
48 0.2382 0.1375 0.5948 0.0272 0.0023 
50 0.9060 0.0276 0.0285 0.0379 0.0000 
51 0.5697 0.3254 0.0946 0.0103 0.0000 
52 0.0000 0.8466 0.1531 0.0000 0.0003 
53 0.6927 - - 0.3066 - 
54 0.0016 0.1845 0.8067 0.0003 0.0068 
55 0.0000 0.4545 0.5201 0.0000 0.0254 
56 0.0747 0.7455 0.1757 0.0032 0.0009 
57 0.0084 0.4963 0.4559 0.0010 0.0384 






Table 3.  Akaike weights (ω) by participant for each model for the LL condition.  Highest 
likelihood values are bolded, indicating most probable model. 
 Akaike weight 












1 0.1988 0.1826 0.0181 0.6003 0.0001 
2 0.0104 0.4063 0.5484 0.0020 0.0330 
3 0.5512 0.0173 0.0167 0.4104 0.0044 
4 0.0000 0.2611 0.7388 0.0000 0.0001 
5 0.7624 0.1193 0.1140 0.0038 0.0005 
6 0.7509 0.0248 0.0234 0.2006 0.0003 
7 0.0161 0.3732 0.2175 0.0047 0.3885 
8 0.1154 0.7232 0.1527 0.0084 0.0002 
9 0.0095 0.4280 0.5387 0.0015 0.0223 
10 0.1659 0.6627 0.1486 0.0227 0.0001 
11 0.9004 0.0313 0.0451 0.0232 0.0000 
12 0.6255 0.0204 0.0190 0.3348 0.0003 
13 0.5737 0.2751 0.0854 0.0645 0.0014 
14 0.0000 0.4850 0.5150 0.0000 0.0000 
15 0.2984 0.4452 0.2092 0.0235 0.0237 
16 0.5290 0.2875 0.1266 0.0569 0.0000 
17 0.0767 0.4480 0.4733 0.0017 0.0003 
18 0.3360 0.2110 0.4186 0.0270 0.0074 
19 0.0930 0.6605 0.2442 0.0020 0.0003 
20 0.6928 0.1478 0.0454 0.1106 0.0034 
21 0.7066 0.0221 0.0241 0.2473 0.0000 
22 0.0001 0.6420 0.3302 0.0000 0.0278 
23 0.0206 0.0324 - 0.0196 0.9191 
24 0.0006 0.0673 0.0663 0.0002 0.8657 
25 0.0002 0.6281 0.3715 0.0000 0.0002 
26 0.4899 0.1050 0.3171 0.0798 0.0082 
27 0.1098 0.2882 0.5833 0.0141 0.0046 
28 0.3992 0.1536 0.3797 0.0666 0.0008 
29 0.0772 0.8302 0.0902 0.0024 0.0000 
30 0.0215 0.6488 0.3080 0.0021 0.0195 
31 0.8399 0.0636 0.0371 0.0593 0.0000 
32 0.1256 0.4680 0.3663 0.0080 0.0321 
33 0.0057 0.0776 0.0671 0.0028 0.8468 
34 0.0001 0.4517 0.5042 0.0000 0.0439 
35 0.1301 0.0041 0.0254 0.8402 0.0002 
36 0.7101 0.0235 0.0370 0.2294 0.0000 
37 0.3213 0.0769 0.6003 0.0015 0.0000 
38 0.2551 0.4082 0.2068 0.0347 0.0953 




39 0.0013 0.4358 0.5624 0.0003 0.0002 
40 0.4758 0.0144 0.0160 0.4878 0.0060 
41 0.2034 0.3490 0.2248 0.0589 0.1640 
42 0.7318 0.0223 0.0231 0.2226 0.0002 
43 0.3921 0.0128 0.0217 0.5734 0.0000 
44 0.3637 0.4933 0.1140 0.0288 0.0002 
45 0.2117 0.0268 0.0238 0.1706 0.5671 
47 0.5932 0.2107 0.1674 0.0285 0.0002 
48 0.1533 0.1401 0.6836 0.0200 0.0030 
50 0.8346 0.0505 0.0337 0.0812 0.0000 
51 0.4883 0.2627 0.0942 0.1449 0.0099 
52 0.0014 0.5230 0.4756 0.0000 0.0000 
53 0.0007 0.2794 0.7189 0.0001 0.0010 
54 0.0018 0.1691 0.8291 0.0001 0.0000 
55 0.2914 0.1476 0.5230 0.0318 0.0061 
56 0.2950 0.0611 0.0620 0.2526 0.3293 
57 0.7017 0.0718 0.0683 0.1417 0.0166 






Table 4.  Akaike weights (ω) by participant for each model for the LM condition.  Highest 
likelihood values are bolded, indicating most probable model. 
 Akaike weight 
      
Participant 









1 0.6929 0.1204 0.1163 0.0648 0.0057 
2 0.8823 0.0273 0.0346 0.0558 0.0000 
3 0.3098 0.0966 0.0174 0.5760 0.0002 
4 0.8479 0.0269 0.0273 0.0978 0.0001 
5 0.7135 0.0224 0.0218 0.2411 0.0012 
6 0.2926 0.0894 0.0177 0.5892 0.0110 
7 0.0593 0.5601 0.3680 0.0085 0.0040 
8 0.1830 0.1715 0.6136 0.0299 0.0021 
9 0.0017 0.0387 0.9595 0.0001 0.0000 
10 0.0205 0.0929 0.8727 0.0052 0.0086 
11 0.6703 0.0210 0.0202 0.2879 0.0005 
12 0.0000 0.9995 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 
13 0.0867 0.5067 0.0119 0.3946 0.0000 
14 0.4693 0.0187 0.0357 0.4763 0.0000 
15 0.8171 0.0391 0.0470 0.0942 0.0026 
16 0.2203 0.1061 0.0218 0.6518 0.0000 
17 0.7085 0.0217 0.0264 0.2418 0.0016 
18 0.1610 0.1634 0.5818 0.0284 0.0654 
19 0.5215 0.0179 0.0205 0.4400 0.0001 
20 0.7306 0.0358 0.0221 0.2114 0.0000 
21 0.6470 0.0944 0.1644 0.0854 0.0087 
22 0.0159 0.1101 0.1428 0.0134 0.7178 
23 0.5912 0.0307 0.0266 0.2965 0.0549 
24 0.4784 0.0225 0.0230 0.4760 0.0000 
25 0.7576 0.0712 0.1168 0.0543 0.0001 
26 0.8701 0.0280 0.0329 0.0690 0.0000 
27 0.5810 0.0509 0.0179 0.3489 0.0013 
28 0.8001 0.0467 0.1215 0.0316 0.0001 
29 0.4508 0.0194 0.0143 0.4739 0.0415 
30 0.0170 0.6443 0.3136 0.0019 0.0232 
31 0.3081 0.0990 0.0258 0.5670 0.0000 
32 0.0012 0.9809 0.0005 0.0173 0.0000 
33 0.5103 0.0687 0.0616 0.3525 0.0070 
34 0.1545 0.7243 0.0035 0.1150 0.0027 
35 0.2013 0.0415 0.0222 0.7349 0.0002 
36 0.8658 0.0293 0.0562 0.0486 0.0000 
37 0.8878 0.0289 0.0609 0.0224 0.0000 
38 0.1714 0.4011 0.2115 0.0283 0.1876 




39 0.0286 0.6067 0.3625 0.0021 0.0001 
40 0.0168 0.9051 0.0023 0.0758 0.0000 
41 0.8213 0.0252 0.0287 0.1247 0.0001 
42 0.4802 0.1161 0.3815 0.0220 0.0003 
43 0.0028 0.9818 0.0004 0.0149 0.0000 
44 0.7011 0.0669 0.1028 0.1091 0.0201 
45 0.4080 0.0967 0.0146 0.4693 0.0115 
47 0.5636 0.0431 0.0170 0.3759 0.0003 
48 0.0005 0.7267 0.2727 0.0000 0.0000 
50 0.0003 0.9944 0.0002 0.0052 0.0000 
51 0.2569 0.6352 0.0922 0.0157 0.0000 
52 0.0918 0.8622 0.0438 0.0022 0.0000 
53 0.6442 0.1033 0.1613 0.0829 0.0083 
54 0.0001 0.3440 0.6556 0.0000 0.0003 
55 0.1368 0.0563 0.0898 0.0323 0.6848 
56 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.0000 
57 0.1620 0.0958 0.0234 0.7188 0.0000 






Table 5.  Spearman correlation coefficients and sifnificance levels for ln(h) values across 
conditions. Significant correlations are in bold. 
  MM ML LL LM 
MM -    
ML .508 (.0001) -   
LL .469 (.0001) .305 (.05) -  





Table 6. Akaike weights (ω) by participant for each model for the MM condition.  Highest 
likelihood values are bolded, indicating most probable model. 
 Akaike weight 












1 0.0311 0.8014 0.1642 0.0030 0.0003 
2 0.8307 0.0382 0.1033 0.0279 0.0000 
3 0.7184 0.0386 0.0443 0.1978 0.0009 
4 0.0149 0.7281 0.2535 0.0011 0.0024 
5 0.0121 0.9208 0.0660 0.0010 0.0001 
6 0.1517 0.5970 0.2367 0.0082 0.0063 
7 0.0010 0.2450 0.7434 0.0002 0.0104 
10 0.0366 0.6393 0.3223 0.0018 0.0000 
11 0.0618 0.8798 0.0484 0.0100 0.0000 
12 0.5545 0.0220 0.0573 0.3662 0.0000 
13 0.0269 0.1907 0.7656 0.0038 0.0131 
14 0.0382 0.4920 0.4633 0.0035 0.0029 
15 0.1579 0.0812 0.7477 0.0128 0.0004 
16 0.7797 0.0263 0.0396 0.1543 0.0001 
17 0.7422 0.1045 0.0755 0.0774 0.0003 
18 0.3495 0.0884 0.5240 0.0367 0.0015 
19 0.1143 0.0999 0.7836 0.0022 0.0000 
20 0.7123 0.0380 0.0834 0.1663 0.0000 
21 0.6752 0.0336 0.0206 0.2704 0.0002 
23 0.0025 0.8523 0.1452 0.0000 0.0000 
24 0.1412 0.7241 0.1336 0.0011 0.0000 
25 0.1775 0.0886 0.7269 0.0070 0.0001 
26 0.4303 0.1215 0.4239 0.0239 0.0004 
27 0.0551 0.0965 0.8372 0.0062 0.0049 
28 0.0201 0.7284 0.2486 0.0021 0.0009 
29 0.0123 0.9696 0.0180 0.0000 0.0000 
30 0.1136 0.3026 0.4188 0.0376 0.1274 
31 0.0198 0.5453 0.2804 0.0051 0.1494 
33 0.0187 0.1302 0.8449 0.0053 0.0009 
34 0.3811 0.1653 0.4340 0.0191 0.0006 
35 0.6120 0.2603 0.1053 0.0223 0.0001 
36 0.9114 0.0318 0.0306 0.0262 0.0000 
37 0.6573 0.1980 0.1137 0.0261 0.0049 
39 0.8906 0.0272 0.0337 0.0485 0.0000 
40 0.7793 0.0576 0.0496 0.1131 0.0004 
41 0.2623 0.1536 0.5075 0.0482 0.0285 
Total 13 12 11 0 0 
 
  




Table 7.  Akaike weights (ω) by participant for each model for the ML condition.  Highest 
likelihood values are bolded, indicating most probable model. 
 Akaike weight 












1 0.0910 0.3371 0.4329 0.0169 0.1222 
2 0.0534 0.0000 0.0273 0.0192 0.9001
3 0.0003 0.3404 0.6202 0.0001 0.0391 
4 0.8126 0.0541 0.0281 0.1051 0.0001 
5 0.6428 0.0216 0.0195 0.3160 0.0000 
6 0.2728 0.5834 0.1328 0.0104 0.0005 
7 0.0001 0.1942 0.1543 0.0001 0.6513
10 0.6743 0.0240 0.0435 0.2582 0.0000 
11 0.2587 0.0544 0.0848 0.6022 0.0000 
12 0.6822 0.0288 0.0271 0.2573 0.0046 
13 0.0753 0.0445 0.2088 0.0749 0.5965
14 0.0009 0.3585 0.4207 0.0003 0.2196 
15 0.0002 0.4537 0.4990 0.0000 0.0471 
16 0.5921 0.2103 0.1438 0.0343 0.0195 
17 0.0062 0.4887 0.4790 0.0010 0.0251 
18 0.5544 0.1782 0.1142 0.1367 0.0166 
19 0.0148 0.2758 0.6551 0.0031 0.0512 
20 0.0000 0.0048 0.9951 0.0000 0.0000 
21 0.7068 0.0000 0.0000 0.2932 0.0000 
23 0.0013 0.4948 0.4998 0.0002 0.0038 
24 0.0000 0.7063 0.2930 0.0000 0.0007 
25 0.1434 0.4786 0.3129 0.0589 0.0061 
26 0.6692 0.0407 0.1112 0.1718 0.0072 
27 0.1423 0.1596 0.5857 0.0269 0.0854 
28 0.0753 0.0252 0.0264 0.8731 0.0000 
29 0.3851 0.0414 0.0264 0.2954 0.2517 
30 0.0588 0.5276 0.2467 0.0104 0.1565 
31 0.2461 0.1122 0.0737 0.1084 0.4597
33 0.0008 0.0354 0.0351 0.0006 0.9280
34 0.0007 0.4474 0.5519 0.0000 0.0001 
35 0.0625 0.6113 0.0103 0.3159 0.0000 
36 0.5446 0.2259 0.2214 0.0080 0.0000 
37 0.7820 0.0902 0.1254 0.0024 0.0000 
39 0.0723 0.0694 0.0252 0.8332 0.0000 
40 0.3403 0.0107 0.0190 0.6294 0.0006 
41 0.0001 0.2806 0.7184 0.0000 0.0009 
Total 11 6 10 4 5 
 
  




Table 8.  Akaike weights (ω) by participant for each model for the LM condition.  Highest 
likelihood values are bolded, indicating most probable model.  Asterisks denote data sets for 
which AICc could not be calculated due to a perfect fit for the random noise model (r2 =1). 
 Akaike weight 












1 0.2745 0.0267 0.0000 0.2704 0.4284
2     * 
3 0.7788 0.0412 0.0761 0.1033 0.0006 
4 0.6454 0.0288 0.0220 0.3003 0.0035 
5 0.3538 0.1606 0.0149 0.4705 0.0001 
6 0.4126 0.0125 0.0166 0.5515 0.0068 
7     * 
10 0.6481 0.0472 0.0221 0.2826 0.0001 
11 0.0131 0.7339 0.0074 0.2455 0.0000 
12 0.3561 0.0741 0.0196 0.5501 0.0001 
13 0.0000 0.0323 0.0325 0.0000 0.9352
14 0.0267 0.9406 0.0010 0.0315 0.0001 
15 0.7548 0.0228 0.0387 0.1834 0.0004 
16 0.8276 0.0254 0.0251 0.1219 0.0000 
17 0.0363 0.8828 0.0024 0.0785 0.0000 
18 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
19 0.4518 0.1108 0.3120 0.0921 0.0332 
20 0.1425 0.0207 0.0207 0.1328 0.6834
21     * 
23 0.7533 0.0839 0.1190 0.0436 0.0002 
24 0.0084 0.3153 0.6742 0.0014 0.0006 
25 0.0022 0.9902 0.0002 0.0074 0.0000 
26 0.8402 0.0275 0.0339 0.0984 0.0001 
27 0.7438 0.0459 0.2037 0.0066 0.0000 
28 0.6816 0.0216 0.0209 0.2757 0.0001 
29 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
30 0.5612 0.0200 0.0271 0.3877 0.0040 
31 0.5105 0.0452 0.0687 0.3304 0.0452 
33     * 
34 0.7038 0.0422 0.0788 0.1701 0.0051 
35 0.0977 0.3980 0.3443 0.0115 0.1486 
36 0.0048 0.8646 0.0038 0.1268 0.0000 
37 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
39 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
40 0.7467 0.0257 0.0249 0.2025 0.0002 
41 0.8390 0.0268 0.0329 0.1012 0.0001 
Total 15 10 1 3 7 
 




Table 9. Obtained probabilities. 
 Participant  
Programmed 
Probability 01 02 03 04 05 06 Total 
5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
10% 18.2% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 12.5% 8.9% 
25% 50.0% 28.6% 25.0% 28.6% 50.0% 37.5% 35.0% 
50% 44.0% 40.0% 50.0% 81.8% 50.0% 62.5% 55.6% 




Table 10. Mean fidelity and range by participant and condition. 
Participant Incentive Disincentive 
01 90% (80%-100%) 100% 
02 91.1% (80%-100%) 96.4% (80%-100%) 
03 92.5% (80%-100%) 100% 
04 100% 92.7% (80%-100%) 
05 100% 100% 






Table 11. BIS/BAS 
 Participant 
Item 01 02 03 04 05 06 
1 3 4 4 3 4 3 
2 2 1 3 1 2 2 
3 3 3 4 2 3 3 
4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
5 3 3 4 4 3 3 
6 2 2 4 4 2 2 
7 4 3 4 4 3 3 
8 2 3 2 4 3 2 
9 2 3 4 2 3 3 
10 3 3 3 4 3 2 
11 2 2 2 3 2 2 
12 2 3 3 2 2 3 
13 3 4 4 4 3 3 
14 3 3 4 3 3 3 
15 2 4 4 1 2 2 
16 3 3 2 4 2 3 
17 2 3 4 4 4 3 
18 2 3 4 4 3 3 
19 3 4 4 4 3 3 
20 3 2 4 3 3 2 
21 2 3 3 2 3 2 
22 2 2 3 1 2 2 
23 4 3 4 4 3 3 
24 3 3 4 4 3 3 
BAS Drive Score 11 8 6 12 9 9 
BAS Fun Seeking 
Score 
9 8 5 8 9 11 
BAS Reward 
Responsiveness Score 
9 10 5 6 10 10 










Figure 1.  Open data points depict indifference points for each participant. Closed data points are 
group medians. Crosses depict the expected value function. The curve is the least-squares 






Figure 2.  Mean and standard error for natural log-transformed values of h derived from the 
simple hyperbolic discounting function.  The asterisks denote a statistically significant difference 







Figure 3.  Mean and standard error for Effective Probability 50% (EP50) for hyperbolic fits (top 
panel) and individualized fits (bottom panel) based on the AIC algorithm.  The asterisks denote a 













Figure 5.  Scatterplots and best-fit linear regression lines for ln(h) values and nominal amounts 





Figure 6.  Open data points depict indifference points for each participant. Closed data points are 
group medians. Crosses depict the expected value function. The curve is the least-squares 






Figure 7.  Mean and standard error for natural log-transformed values of h derived from the 
simple hyperbolic discounting function.  Asterisks denote level of significance (**: p < .01; ***: 






Figure 8.  Mean and standard error for Effective Probability 50% (EP50) for hyperbolic fits 
(closed data points) and individualized fits (open data points) based on the AIC algorithm.  







Figure 9.  Mean and standard error for area under the curve (AUC).  The asterisk denotes a 






Figure 10.  Time-series data for participants 01, 02, and 04. The last, larger data point denotes 
the conditions chosen and processing rate during the choice phase. The horizontal dotted line 





Figure 11.  Time-series data for participants 03, 05, and 06. The last, larger data point denotes 
the conditions chosen and processing rate during the choice phase. The horizontal dotted line 





Figure 12. Check processing rate of last block for each probability. Open circles depict Incentive 











Figure 14. Scatterplot of last block rate by probability for incentive (top panel) and disincentive 















1. Database Search (n = 1,348) 
a. PsycINFO (keywords appear anywhere) 
i. (Probability OR Probabilistic) AND Discounting (n = 219) 
ii. (Risk OR Risky) AND Discounting (n = 319) 
iii. (Cross Commodity OR Cross-Commodity) AND Discounting (n = 1) 
b. PubMed (search all fields) 
i. (Probability OR Probabilistic) AND Discounting (n = 406) 
ii. (Risk OR Risky) AND Discounting (n = 398) 
iii. (Cross Commodity OR Cross-Commodity) AND Discounting (n = 3) 
2. Removed Duplicate Records (n = 862) 
3. Screening (n = 50) 
a. Published in English 
b. Peer-Reviewed 
c. Empirical 
d. Subject is probability and/or cross-commodity discounting (any mode) 
e. Non-clinical or pathological population (illicit/addictive substances, or gambling) 
4. Applied Exclusionary Criteria (n = 34) 
a. Demographic comparative studies 
b. Psychometric property evaluations 
c. Methodological evaluations 



















Burnham and Anderson (2004) state AICc is not easily interpretable alone because the value is 
dependent on the form of the data analyzed.  They describe the calculations required to transform 
the values into weighted probabilities.  First, AICc values are re-scaled relative to the minimum 
value obtained from the compared models. 
∆ 	  
AICmin is the minimum AIC value of all models compared.  ∆i represents the lost information 
resulting from using a given model compared to the best model.  Models with a difference of 10 
or greater than the minimum are not supported as a probable model for the data at hand. 
From these values, a likelihood function is calculated with 
	|	 exp	 ∆ /2   . 
The ratio of the likelihood functions for two models is termed the evidence ratio and represents 
the relative likelihood of one model compared to the other. 
Akaike weights normalize likelihood functions of the model set and represent the weight of 
evidence for a given model being the best model.  Weights are calculated using 
exp	 ∆ /2
∑ exp	 ∆ /2
 
The weights for all models compared sum to 1.  The weight for each model can be interpreted as 










BIS/BAS (Carver & White, 1994) 
Instructions: Please respond to the following statements by indicating the degree to which you either 






1. A person’s family is the most important thing in life. 1 2 3 4 
2. Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I 
    rarely experience fear or nervousness. 
1 2 3 4 
3. I go out of my way to get things I want. 1 2 3 4 
4. When I'm doing well at something I love to keep at it. 1 2 3 4 
5. I'm always willing to try something new if I think it 
    will be fun. 
1 2 3 4 
6. How I dress is important to me. 1 2 3 4 
7. When I get something I want, I feel excited and 
    energized. 
1 2 3 4 
8. Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit. 1 2 3 4 
9. When I want something I usually go all-out to get it. 1 2 3 4 
10. I will often do things for no other reason than that 
      they might be fun. 
1 2 3 4 
11. It's hard for me to find the time to do things such as 
      get a haircut. 
1 2 3 4 
12. If I see a chance to get something I want I move on it 
      right away. 
1 2 3 4 
13. I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know 
      somebody is angry at me. 
1 2 3 4 
14. When I see an opportunity for something I like I get 
       excited right away. 
1 2 3 4 
15. I often act on the spur of the moment. 1 2 3 4 
16. If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I 
      usually get pretty "worked up." 
1 2 3 4 
17. I often wonder why people act the way they do. 1 2 3 4 
18. When good things happen to me, it affects me 
       strongly. 
1 2 3 4 
19. I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at 
      something important. 
1 2 3 4 
20. I crave excitement and new sensations. 1 2 3 4 
21. When I go after something I use a "no holds barred" 
      approach. 
1 2 3 4 
22. I have very few fears compared to my friends. 1 2 3 4 
23. It would excite me to win a contest. 1 2 3 4 










Welcome and thank you for keeping your appointment.  The purpose of this study is to evaluate 
preference for the various bonus arrangements we are presenting. This will be your workspace 
for the duration of the experiment.  You can feel free to bring anything with you into the room 
including your cellphone, laptop, or homework.  You’ll notice that there is a task that you may 
complete if you wish.  To complete the task, type the amount of each check into the box on the 
right and press ENTER or click Submit.  You can choose to process as many or as few checks as 
you’d like.  Regardless of what you do, you will be paid $2.50 for your time.  In a moment, I will 
leave the room for five minutes.  Over the course of those five minutes, there is a chance that I 
will evaluate your performance. 
Incentive Script: 
If your performance is evaluated and your performance has met the criterion of 16 checks 
processed correctly per minute, you will also earn a $0.75 bonus.  If your performance did 
not meet the criterion, you will not receive the bonus, but again, you will be paid $2.50 per 
hour either way.  If your performance is not evaluated, you will not receive the bonus 
whether you completed the work task or not.  For the next five minutes, the chance that your 
performance will be evaluated is XX% and the chance that you will not be evaluated is XX%.  
To determine whether your performance will be evaluated, I will roll a 20-sided die and if it 
lands on X-Y, then I will apply the criterion for the bonus.  Otherwise, you will not be eligible 
for the bonus.  As a reminder, you can do as much or as little work as you’d like.  The purpose 
of this study is to evaluate preference for the various bonus arrangements we are presenting. 
Disincentive Script: 
You will receive a $0.75 bonus at the end of the session unless your performance is 
evaluated and you failed to meet the criterion of 16 checks processed correctly per minute.  
If your performance is not evaluated, you will receive the bonus regardless of how much 
work you did.  For the next five minutes, the chance that your performance will be evaluated is 
XX% and the chance that you will not be evaluated is XX%.  To determine whether your 
performance will be evaluated, I will roll a 20-sided die and if it lands on X-Y, then I will apply 
the criterion for the bonus.  Otherwise you will receive the bonus regardless of how much 
work you did.  As a reminder, you can do as much or as little work as you’d like. 
